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INTRODUCTION: POLICE PRIVILEGE 
When police kill unarmed civilians, prosecutors and grand juries  
often decline to bring criminal charges. Even when police officers are 
indicted, they are seldom convicted at trial.1 There are many reasons why 
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police are rarely convicted for violent acts. Commentators have criticized 
the inherent conflict of interest for prosecutors who decide whether to 
bring charges2 and the fact that police are investigating their own.3  
However, this article considers another way that police may be treated 
differently than other people suspected of committing violent crimes. 
The Fourth Amendment, designed to protect civilians from overzealous 
officers, now helps insulate police suspected of committing violent 
crimes. 
Tamir Rice was a twelve-year-old playing with a toy gun in a 
Cleveland park in November of 2014 when Officer Timothy Loehmann 
drove up in a cruiser. “Within two seconds of the car’s arrival, Officer 
Loehmann shot Tamir in the abdomen from point-blank range,” security 
camera footage of the incident showed, “raising doubts that he could 
have warned the boy three times to raise his hands, as the police later 
claimed.”4 The Cuyahoga County Prosecutor recommended to the grand 
jury that they find that there was no probable cause to conclude that 
Rice’s shooting had been a crime, and the grand jury followed this  
recommendation.5 The NAACP pronounced it a “miscarriage of justice” 
that demonstrated an “imbalance in the system that’s supposed to treat all 
citizens with impartiality and make decisions in reliance on basic facts 
                                                                                                                       
 1. Kimberly Kindy and Kimbriell Kelly, Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted, WASH. POST, 
(Apr. 11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/11/thousands-dead-few-
prosecuted/ [https://perma.cc/8ET3-RXX8] (“Among the thousands of fatal shootings at the hands of 
police since 2005, only 54 officers have been charged, a Post analysis found. Most were cleared or 
acquitted in the cases that have been resolved.”). 
 2. See Kami Chavis Simmons, Increasing Police Accountability: Restoring Trust and  
Legitimacy Through the Appointment of Independent Prosecutors, 49 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 137, 
140–41 (2015); Note, Chapter Four Considering Police Body Cameras, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1794, 
1815 (2015); Monroe Freedman & Paul Butler, Opinion, Ferguson Prosecutor Should Have Bowed 
Out, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 8, 2014, at 30; Paul Butler, Opinion, The System Must Counteract  




 3. Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of Bias and 
 Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 237 n.15 (1998); Steven 
Rosenfeld, 10 Ways the System is Rigged Against Justice for People Wrongly Killed by Cops, AM. 
PROSPECT (Dec. 4, 2014), http://prospect.org/article/10-ways-system-rigged-against-justice-people-
wrongly-killed-cops [https://perma.cc/CAW7-M8V6 ] (explaining that one reason the Ferguson 
police officer who killed Michael Brown was not charged was because “police are investigating their 
own”). 
 4. Shaila Dewan & Richard A. Oppel Jr., In Tamir Rice Case, Many Errors by Cleveland  
Police, Then a Fatal One, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/23/us/in-
tamir-rice-shooting-in-cleveland-many-errors-by-police-then-a-fatal-one.html. 
 5. Leon Neyfakh, Tamir Rice’s Death Resulted from “Officer-Created Jeopardy.” So Why 
Were No Officers Indicted?, SLATE: THE SLATEST (Dec. 28, 2015, 5:19 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/12/28/tamir_rice_s_death_didn_t_lead_to_indictments_
because_of_supreme_court_vagueness.html [https://perma.cc/H9A4-3X2W]. 
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and probable cause.”6 The prosecutor explained that he relied on the 
Fourth Amendment law of search and seizure rather than Ohio law in 
reaching his conclusion.7 This is a problem. 
The concept of excessive force became part of search and seizure 
doctrine in the 1985 Supreme Court case, Tennessee v. Garner.8 Garner 
provided some measure of protection by allowing civil rights lawsuits to 
proceed when police shot or killed suspects under the Supreme Court’s 
Fourth Amendment definition of “excessive force.” Because of the 
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, the decision would henceforth 
permit criminal defendants who had been victims of excessive force to 
suppress evidence found as a result of the police improperly shooting 
them. Subsequent Supreme Court cases have made it more difficult to 
sue police for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and to  
suppress evidence, but this should not prevent police from facing job 
consequences for bad behavior.9 Nor should the diminished Fourth 
Amendment necessarily prevent prosecutors from charging police for 
violating state criminal codes.10 
                                                     
 6. Polly Mosendz, ‘This Was Not a Man. This Was a Child’: Activists React to Grand Jury 
Decision in Tamir Rice’s Shooting Death, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 28, 2015, 4:31 PM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/tamir-rice-jury-charges-reactions-409420 [https://perma.cc/NZ4N-
RZXW]. 
 7. Eric Heisig, Here is the Case Law Prosecutor McGinty Used in the Tamir Rice Probe, 
CLEVELAND.COM, (Dec. 30, 2015, 12:00 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/court-
justice/index.ssf/2015/12/here_is_the_case_law_prosecuto_1.html [https://perma.cc/YKJ4-KDJY]. 
Prosecutor Timothy J. McGinty had first sought political cover for the decision not to charge by 
asking independent investigators to determine if the officer should be tried. Retired FBI Agent  
Kimberly Crawford and Denver Prosecutor S. Lamar Sims conducted the investigative reviews 
requested by the Cuyahoga County District Attorney. Both investigators cleared the officers of 
crimes, basing their conclusion on Fourth Amendment case law rather than Ohio law. See Goldie 
Taylor, When Shooting a 12-Year-Old is Deemed ‘Reasonable’, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 10, 2015, 6:05 
PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/10/10/tamir-rice-shooting-found-reasonable.html 
[https://perma.cc/82EG-9GQS]. 
 8. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 9. A few police departments have recently decided that the Fourth Amendment is an  
insufficient check on the police, especially when it comes to the use of force. These departments are 
requiring more from their officers. See Criminal (In)justice: Episode 8, DAVID HARRIS (May 17, 
2016), http://www.criminalinjusticepodcast.com/episodes/ [https://perma.cc/8XW5-LPT5]. David 
Harris is a professor of law at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. 
 10. The expanded qualified immunity doctrine impedes civil rights litigation. See, e.g., Karen 
M. Blum, Scott v. Harris: Death Knell for Deadly Force Policies and Garner Jury Instructions?, 58 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 45, 76 (2007) (discussing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007)); Linda Sheryl 
Greene, Before and After Michael Brown—Toward an End to Structural and Actual Violence, 49 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 38–39 (2015) (discussing Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014) 
and San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015)) (“The regime for the possible redress of 
excessive force makes the loss or preservation of life in police encounters dependent on the  
judgment of an individual officer in a framework in which killing is permissible unless it has been 
strictly forbidden by prior precedent or limited by individual local police authority. This is  
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In the criminal investigation into Tamir Rice’s death, the Fourth 
Amendment’s excessive force doctrine was used in a different  
way: instead of shielding an individual from the police, the search and 
seizure doctrine became a shield to protect police from the state’s  
criminal laws. However, the Fourth Amendment provisions that prevent 
police from invading people’s privacy without proper justification were 
always intended to be a floor, that is, a minimum set of protections 
against police power, rather than a ceiling.11 For example, the Fourth 
Amendment’s search and seizure rules are the proper law to use when an 
accused individual moves to suppress the evidence against him or her 
under the United States Constitution, but not when the accused relies on 
state law that grants greater protections against police intrusions.12 When 
the Supreme Court rules in favor of the police, finding that they did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment in a given situation, the Court anticipates 
that the officers might be punished for violating other laws or  
regulations. Because the Fourth Amendment was designed to be a floor, 
the federal constitutional law on search and seizure should not guide 
prosecutors and juries who decide whether police officers violated a 
state’s criminal code.13 
When the defendant on trial is a police officer, it flips the usual  
paradigm. Both judges and prosecutors must switch their perspectives. In 
motions to suppress where the Fourth Amendment should control the 
outcome, the government is in the position of defending police tactics 
and seeking to enlarge the ability of police to use intrusive or aggressive 
behavior toward civilians. Police power and privilege benefits the  
prosecution and harms the accused. In contrast, when police officers are 
accused of violent crimes, police power and privilege serves to benefit 
the accused and hurt the prosecution. Prosecutors should no longer  
invoke the constitutional doctrines regarding police power, but should 
instead seek to treat the accused like any other criminal defendant. It is 
especially difficult for judges to switch their thinking and treat all  
defendants alike, for judges read many search and seizure cases where 
the Supreme Court expanded the right of police to behave aggressively 
and with racial animus without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment. 
                                                                                                                       
sanctioned arbitrariness in the imposition of death that has affected Black communities around the 
nation.”). Id. at 42–43. 
 11. Susan N. Herman, The USA Patriot Act and the Submajoritarian Fourth Amendment, 41 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 67, 119 (2006). 
 12. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977). 
 13. See Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 
1183 (2008). 
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Should police defendants be treated the same as any other  
defendant at trial? After all, police are different from other criminal  
defendants. As Kristian Williams wrote in his history of policing in the 
United States, “[V]iolence is an inherent part of policing. The police  
represent the most direct means by which the state imposes its will on the 
citizenry.”14 In other words, the public asks police to use force and  
deadly force to carry out its missions; grabbing, searching, and shooting 
are all skills that an officer must possess. On the other hand, police 
should not be able to get away with murder. Nor should they be  
permitted to behave like bullies. Because police are permitted to use 
force in situations where civilians may not, prosecutors and judges might 
be tempted to turn to the Fourth Amendment to evaluate whether the  
accused police officer committed a violent crime such as murder or  
criminal assault.15 Judges who routinely read and apply search and  
seizure case law during preliminary motions might turn unconsciously to 
this case law when presiding over trials where the criminal defendant is a 
police officer. 
While the experts who decided that the police who shot Tamir Rice 
should not be charged were explicit in their reliance upon Supreme Court 
search and seizure case law, decisions not to indict or to acquit are often 
opaque.16 Prosecutors need not reveal how they reach their decisions, and 
grand jury sessions can be as secret as petit jury deliberations. Ironically, 
the case that best illustrates the impact of Fourth Amendment doctrine 
upon a criminal trial was a situation where the victim was not even killed 
by a bona fide police officer. 
The death of Trayvon Martin in 2012 at the hands of  
“neighborhood-watch volunteer” George Zimmerman launched a  
national discussion about racial profiling. As a result of national  
pressure, Zimmerman faced a six-week trial on murder charges. The trial 
ended in a complete acquittal on July 25, 2013, and the Black Lives  
Matter movement traces its origins to that not guilty verdict.17 Although 
                                                     
 14. KRISTIAN WILLIAMS, OUR ENEMIES IN BLUE: POLICE AND POWER IN AMERICA 32 (AK 
Press, 2015). 
 15. Chase Madar, Why It’s Impossible to Indict a Cop, NATION (Nov. 25, 2014), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/why-its-impossible-indict-cop/ [https://perma.cc/NLZ8-TX7S] 
(“According to Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean of the UC Irvine Law School, recent Supreme Court 
decisions are not a path towards justice but rather a series of obstacles to holding police accountable 
for civil rights violations.”). 
 16. Diane E. Courselle, Struggling with Deliberative Secrecy, Jury Independence, and Jury 
Reform, 57 S.C. L. REV. 203, 206–07 (2005). 
 17. See Julia Craven, Black Lives Matter Co-Founder Reflects on the Origins of the Movement, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 30, 2015, 3:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/black-lives-
matter-opal-tometi_us_560c1c59e4b0768127003227 [https://perma.cc/Z8X3-BHSF] (Opal Tometi: 
6 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 40:1 
George Zimmerman was merely a volunteer neighborhood watch  
captain, Zimmerman’s case provides a useful vehicle for exploring how 
Fourth Amendment doctrine can privilege police defendants. 
Although scholars described the favorable treatment afforded to 
Trayvon Martin’s killer by police and prosecutors, they looked at  
explanations other than the Supreme Court’s expansion of police power 
under the Fourth Amendment. Some commentators have explained 
Zimmerman’s favorable treatment before trial by pointing to Florida’s 
“Stand Your Ground” law.18 The statute, they assert, allowed Sanford 
police to let Zimmerman walk out of the police station a free man on the 
day he shot Martin, an innocent, unarmed seventeen-year-old.19 Other 
scholars have delved into the role that race played in the government’s 
delay in charging Zimmerman, a white Hispanic, with killing a black 
youth. Tamara Lawson asserted that the “Stand Your Ground” statute 
was an excuse rather than the cause of the Sanford police and  
prosecutors’ intransigence, blaming conscious or unconscious racial bias 
for Zimmerman’s preferential treatment.20 Cynthia Lee concurred,  
explaining: “Had Zimmerman been an African American man who  
followed and then shot an unarmed Caucasian teenager during a fist 
fight, it is unlikely that police would have released Zimmerman without 
any charges.”21 While both “Stand Your Ground” statutes and racial bias 
                                                                                                                       
“I was struck with the fact that my younger brother—who was 14 at the time—could have been 
Trayvon.”). 
 18. On April 26, 2005, Florida Governor Jeb Bush signed into law SB 436, known then as the 
“Castle Doctrine” or “Stand Your Ground.” FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (2005). 
 19. Tamara Rice Lave, Shoot to Kill: A Critical Look at Stand Your Ground Laws, 67  
U. MIAMI L. REV. 827, 853–54 (2013); see also Aya Gruber, Leniency as a Miscarriage of Race and 
Gender Justice, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1571, 1572–73 (2013) (“It soon became politically polarized.  
Liberals condemn the shooter, George Zimmerman, for acting on racialized suspicion, the Sanford 
police for declining to arrest, and the Florida law for permitting a person to kill even when safe 
retreat is possible. Conservatives, by contrast, tend to side with Zimmerman, a local neighborhood 
watch leader, denying that he acted on the basis of race, and supporting the law as permitting  
law-abiding citizens to defend themselves.”); Tamara F. Lawson, A Fresh Cut in an Old Wound—A 
Critical Analysis of the Trayvon Martin Killing: The Public Outcry, the Prosecutors’ Discretion, and 
the Stand Your Ground Law, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 271 (2012). 
 20. See Lawson, supra note 19; see also Michael Saba, And Justice for All? Debating the  
Zimmerman Arrest and Race in America, CNN (Apr. 13, 2012, 1:45 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/13/us/zimmerman-reax-irpt/ [https://perma.cc/9J8M-BVZH]; CBS/AP 
Zimmerman Booked on 2nd-Degree Murder Charge, CBS (July 10, 2013, 9:51 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57412675/ [https://perma.cc/8UFP-QJ9N]. 
 21. See Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Post-Racial 
Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1565–66, 1577 (2013) (“It is unlikely that George Zimmerman set 
out that night intending to kill a Black person, but implicit bias likely influenced him to see Martin 
as someone who looked suspicious and dangerous . . . . When there is a dead victim and police know 
who killed the victim, they usually arrest the obvious perpetrator of the homicide and then  
investigate.”). Lee also examined the role that race played in the shooting itself, noting: “It is  
unlikely that Zimmerman would have thought Martin was ‘real suspicious,’ ‘up to no good,’ and ‘on 
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are important lenses to use to interpret Zimmerman’s preferential  
treatment, another dimension to this drama has gone largely unnoticed. 
The government’s delay in charging Zimmerman and the trial judge’s 
rulings during trial should also be examined through the lens of police 
power and police privilege. 
The excessive force doctrine is but one way that Fourth  
Amendment case law may influence the prosecution of police. This  
Article demonstrates how the Supreme Court’s search and seizure  
decisions often mask aggressive and racially motivated policing  
methods. There is a risk that police who are accused of violent acts will 
benefit from this case law even though it was intended for pretrial  
motions to suppress evidence and civil rights lawsuits, rather than to 
guide judges during criminal trials. While police may need a different 
standard than other criminal defendants, applying the Fourth Amendment 
case law to criminal prosecutions can give police defendants an unfair 
advantage. 
Part I analyzes Supreme Court doctrine that empowers the police. 
Part I.A analyzes the case law governing Fourth Amendment search and 
seizure and demonstrates that, through its opinions, the Supreme Court 
has labeled aggressive forms of policing as nonaggressive. In these  
decisions that resolve motions to suppress evidence and civil rights  
complaints, the Court camouflages aggression through doctrine. Part I.B 
demonstrates how racial profiling is tolerated and rendered invisible in 
the Fourth Amendment context. The Fourth Amendment case law on the 
police’s power to use force against civilians is coupled with the police’s 
power to treat civilians unequally based on conscious and unconscious 
racial bias. 
Part II explores the relationship between Fourth Amendment  
doctrine and the George Zimmerman trial. Part II.A lays out the evidence 
introduced against Zimmerman to support a charge of murder or  
manslaughter, while Part II.B shows how Zimmerman’s behavior that 
fateful night mimicked that of a police officer and how the government’s 
response to the shooting of Trayvon Martin paralleled cases where police 
officers killed civilians. Part II.C examines the trial judge’s first  
controversial ruling when she prevented the prosecution from arguing 
that Zimmerman engaged in racial profiling. While her ruling flies in the 
face of precedent in the criminal arena, her decision makes sense if one 
imagines the facts through a Fourth Amendment lens, where racial  
profiling is tolerated and rendered invisible. Part II.D explores the trial 
judge’s second controversial ruling—her refusal to instruct  
                                                                                                                       
drugs or something’ if Martin had been White. Race likely influenced Zimmerman’s perception that 
Martin posed a threat of criminality, whether Zimmerman was aware of this or not.” Id. at 1565. 
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Zimmerman’s jury on the rule of aggressors, a core limitation on the 
right of self-defense. Although her ruling contradicts precedent in  
criminal trials, her decision makes sense if one looks through a Fourth 
Amendment lens because the Court has redefined aggressive police  
behavior so that judges must consider it lawful and benign. The trial 
judge did not explain either controversial ruling. Part II.E examines  
social science in the area of judicial decision-making to show how judges 
may be influenced on an unconscious level by what they read or view, 
such as Supreme Court case law. Thus, Supreme Court opinions that 
permit police aggressive behavior by relabeling it as benign, and case 
law that camouflages racial profiling, provide a plausible explanation for 
the controversial rulings in George Zimmerman’s prosecution. 
Part III seeks solutions to the unfair Fourth Amendment privilege 
that infects trials where police and their helpers stand accused.  
Neighborhood watch volunteers should be treated the same as any other 
defendant, and while legislatures may want to provide police defendants 
with more protections than civilian criminal defendants, the Fourth 
Amendment protections are excessive. The Fourth Amendment was  
designed to protect individuals from the police, but it has become a 
method to protect police from the reach of criminal statutes. 
I. SUPREME COURT CASE LAW THAT  
CHARACTERIZES POLICE AGGRESSION AS BENIGN 
In George Zimmerman’s murder trial, the trial judge made two  
surprising rulings that helped the accused. In an early ruling,  
Zimmerman’s judge refused to allow the prosecution to argue that the 
neighborhood-watch volunteer racially profiled Martin. In a later ruling, 
the trial judge refused to instruct the jury that aggressors lose their right 
to self-defense unless certain conditions are met. At first glance, these 
rulings confound the observer. For one, the government is usually  
allowed to prove racial bias as a motive for criminal violence. Even more 
confounding, the aggressor rule that the judge hid from the jury  
represents a core, long-standing limit on the right to self-defense. These 
rulings will make sense when put into the context of search and seizure 
case law. 
The Fourth Amendment governs the rules of search and seizure, 
and the Supreme Court case law interpreting the Constitution, therefore, 
determines when the police have the power to arrest, detain, search, or 
use deadly force. In a large proportion of criminal trials, defense  
attorneys file motions called “motions to suppress” evidence, arguing 
that police violated the Constitution in gathering evidence, and, as a  
result, the government should not be permitted to use the resulting  
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evidence at trial. Judges, such as the trial court judge who presided over 
Zimmerman’s case, routinely hold hearings with live testimony and must 
read and apply Supreme Court precedent to resolve the allegations before 
trial. It is unnecessary to decide whether the trial judge in Zimmerman’s 
case consciously imported Fourth Amendment doctrine. Whether or not 
trial judges are consciously aware of how Supreme Court doctrine  
creates police privilege, it is reasonable to predict a spillover effect from 
motions to suppress where police are government witnesses into cases 
where police are criminal defendants. Sections A and B below lay out the 
Fourth Amendment decisions that correspond to the two contentious  
rulings that benefited George Zimmerman. 
A. Chasing Civilians and Other Nonaggressive Behaviors 
Many Supreme Court opinions pretend that police are neither  
aggressive nor their actions coercive when they interact with civilians. 
These opinions form a significant part of Fourth Amendment doctrine 
governing police behavior. This Section will examine some of the ways 
that the fiction of unintimidating police officers permeates constitutional 
law. Whether or not judges believe in the myth of nonintimidating police 
officers, judges have been trained to undervalue the fear and threat felt 
by those singled out for unwanted attention by police and are expected to 
apply Supreme Court doctrine. 
One area where the Fourth Amendment doctrine imagines that  
police are nonthreatening is consent searches. The Supreme Court  
imagines that when police bang loudly on the front door of a home,  
yelling “police,” the people inside will know that they may choose to 
assert their constitutional right to be left alone.22 According to recent 
precedent, if civilians open up the door it is because they are freely 
choosing to consent to this invasion of privacy. “Occupants who choose 
not to stand on their constitutional rights [by not answering the door 
when police bang on it] have only themselves to blame,” reasoned the 
Court in Kentucky v. King.23 
In 2011, when the Supreme Court decided Kentucky v. King, there 
was long-established precedent declaring that civilians who acquiesce to 
                                                     
 22. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 456 (2011) (discussing an example of an officer who 
testified that he and other officers banged on an apartment door “as loud as [they] could” and  
announced, “‘this is the police’ or ‘Police, police, police’”). 
 23. Id. at 470. Note that in Kentucky v. King, when the occupants did not open the door, the 
police broke down the door claiming to have smelled marijuana and to have heard sounds consistent 
with people moving about inside to destroy evidence. The issue before the Supreme Court was 
whether police can avoid the search warrant requirements by creating exigent circumstances by 
knocking on the door of a home seeking entry instead of obtaining a warrant and then using the 
response from the occupants to satisfy a warrant exception. 
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police demands are not giving voluntary consent.24 As the Court  
explained, “acquiescence to” police demand is not consent.25 The King 
case did not change this rule. Instead, the Court labeled the police  
behavior at issue as nonaggressive and pretended that the police did not 
demand entry. In fact, the Court compared police coming onto curtilage 
and knocking on doors to investigate crimes as similar to door-to-door 
salesmen or pollsters, strangers that can be easily ignored.26 “When law 
enforcement officers who are not armed with a warrant knock on a door, 
they do no more than any private citizen might do.”27 Police are so  
unthreatening that people need not be told they have a right to refuse 
consent.28 This fiction that police are not authority figures who demand 
compliance with their requests permeates Fourth Amendment rules. 
The King Court rejected the trial judge’s conclusion that the police 
officers “demanded” entry even though the trial judge based her  
conclusion on specific factual considerations, including the loudness of 
the knock and the officers yelling “police” multiple times.29 Writing for 
the Court, Justice Alito explained: 
Police officers may have a very good reason to announce their  
presence loudly and to knock on the door with some  
force. . . . Citizens who are startled by an unexpected knock on the 
door . . . may appreciate the opportunity to make an informed  
decision about whether to answer the door to the police.30  
                                                     
 24. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 644 (1961) (holding that a defendant who was shown a false 
search warrant was coerced into consenting to a search). 
 25. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548–49 (1968) (“[A]cquiescence to a claim of 
lawful authority” is not consent.); see United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 577 (1980) 
(White, J., dissenting) (“While the Government need not prove that Ms. Mendenhall knew that she 
had a right to refuse to accompany the officers, . . . it cannot rely solely on acquiescence to the  
officers’ wishes to establish the requisite consent.”); see also Schaffer v. State, 988 P.2d 610,  
615–16 (1999) (concluding that consent is not proved when the facts “establish nothing more than 
acquiescence to apparent lawful authority”) (citing 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A 
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.6(g) (3d ed. 1996)). 
 26. The Court kept the definition of consent, but ruled that the behavior was not aggressive as a 
matter of law. Andrew Taslitz explains that in Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013),  
[t]he court agreed that under certain circumstances customs or social norms establish  
implied consent for persons to appear at the front door of a home. For example, girl 
scouts, trick-or-treaters, and salesmen may knock on a door, ask for an invitation to enter 
or talk, then either do so if the invitation is accepted or leave if it is rejected. Given that is 
so, the dissenters saw no difference in police engaging in analogous behavior.  
Andrew E. Taslitz, The Cold Nose Might Actually Know? Science & Scent Lineups, 28 CRIM. 
JUST. 4, 7 (2013). 
 27. King, 563 U.S. at 469. 
 28. See generally Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 29. King, 563 U.S. at 471–72. 
 30. Id. at 468. 
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The Supreme Court rejected the notion that police banging “on the 
door as loud as [they] could” and announcing “Police, police, police” 
could be construed as demanding entry or a demand to the person inside 
to open the door.31 “There is no evidence of a ‘demand’ of any sort,” the 
majority opined, ruling that police may knock as loudly as they want and 
yell “police” repeatedly without a reasonable occupant thinking he must 
open the door, as long as police do not explicitly state “open up” or  
explicitly threaten to enter without a warrant.32 
Thus, the Court camouflages the aggressive nature of police activity 
by language that declares that knocking is what “any private citizen 
might do” at a person’s front door. Trial judges learn that the law expects 
them to pretend that a reasonable homeowner freely consents when she 
opens up her door to police who shout “police” as they loudly bang on 
her front door. In reading opinion after Supreme Court opinion, trial 
judges are taught to view aggressive police acts as nonaggressive. 
Searches may even be considered consensual when the person 
submitting to the police is in custody or held by police.33 Consider Sylvia 
Mendenhall, age twenty-two, who was taken to the Drug Enforcement  
Agency’s Office and strip-searched after she got off an airplane.  
Although a plurality of justices determined that Mendenhall was seized 
at the time she accompanied the agents to the airport office, the Court 
nevertheless categorized her cooperation with a strip search as consent. 
The Court was not persuaded by her gentle protestations. The Court 
opined that “when she was told that the search would require the removal 
of her clothing” and she responded that “she had a plane to catch,” this 
did not defeat the government’s burden to prove that she consented and 
that the consent was voluntary.34 Rather, the Court found that this could 
mean that Mendenhall hoped “that the search be conducted quickly, not 
as indicating resistance to the search.”35 
The Mendenhall Court did not change the rule that consent must be 
voluntarily given and may not be a result of coercion.36 In finding 
Mendenhall’s consent to be voluntarily given, the Court essentially  
declared that police are not aggressive when they seize individuals and 
                                                     
 31. Id. at 471–72. 
 32. See id. 
 33. Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1183 (2012) (holding that a prisoner taken to a locked 
conference room in the administrative section of a jail is not “in custody” for Miranda purposes, so 
there is no need to provide warnings before interrogation). 
 34. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 559 (1980). 
 35. Id. at 545. In addition, the Court was not impressed by the fact that all the officers involved 
were white while the young woman targeted was black; this did not even affect their decision that a 
woman in Mendenhall’s position would not view the police’s request to submit to a strip search as a 
demand. Id.  
 36. See id. 
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seek cooperation, even when seeking consent for a humiliating act, such 
as a young woman revealing her body to a stranger based on suspicion of 
criminality.37 Thus, the law teaches trial judges to view inherently  
coercive encounters as voluntary and to see regular police aggression as 
nonaggressive. 
The Fourth Amendment definition of a seizure also forces trial 
judges to view various types of aggressive police behavior as  
nonaggressive. An individual who reasonably believes he is not free to 
walk away or otherwise terminate the encounter has been seized,  
according to the Court.38 Nevertheless, the Court often concludes that an 
individual was not seized in situations where it seems beyond dispute 
that he wished to terminate the encounter but instead felt coerced into 
cooperating. 
The law allows police to target, pursue, and question individuals 
without naming it a seizure. For example, in Florida v. Royer, federal 
agents approached the defendant in the concourse at Miami International 
Airport and asked for his ticket and driver’s license. “Asking for and  
examining Royer’s ticket and his driver’s license were no doubt  
permissible in themselves,”39 wrote Justice White for a plurality,  
meaning that police may take these investigative steps without any  
suspicion whatsoever. Thus, the Court pretends that Mr. Royer only had 
himself to blame for stopping and handing his ticket and license to  
officials. According to the Court, a reasonable person in Mr. Royer’s 
position would have been under no compulsion to comply with these  
official requests.40 
Another example of the Court’s penchant for recharacterizing  
unpleasant interactions between police and civilians as voluntary may be 
found in United States v. Drayton.41 There, police boarded an interstate 
bus to interdict drugs, asking each person individually to identify his or 
her bag so it could be searched. As the dissent explained: “The  
reasonable inference was that the ‘interdiction’ was not a consensual  
exercise, but one the police would carry out whatever the  
circumstances; that they would prefer ‘cooperation’ but would not let the 
                                                     
 37. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 366 (2009) (stating that a  
strip search in a school was “embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating” to a teenaged suspect). 
“The reasonableness of her expectation is . . . indicated by the common reaction of other young 
people similarly searched, whose adolescent vulnerability intensifies the exposure’s patent  
intrusiveness.” Its indignity does not outlaw the search, but it does implicate the rule that “the search 
[be] ‘reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first 
place.’” Id. at 375 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985). 
 38. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). 
 39. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501 (1983). 
 40. Id. 
 41. 536 U.S. 194 (2002). 
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lack of it stand in their way.”42 Although the defendant was literally  
unable to leave because the bus was stopped to allow the police to  
investigate, and although the officer brought his face only one to  
one-and-a-half feet from Drayton’s face as he sought information from 
him, the Court concluded as a matter of law that Drayton had not been 
seized.43 Drayton and the other passengers were not seized when police 
boarded the bus, nor was Drayton seized when a police officer went up to 
his seat, sought his “cooperation” in their drug-interdiction efforts, and 
asked him to identify his bag so they could search it.44 A reasonable  
person would have felt free to tell the police to leave them alone,  
according to the Court. In addition, the search of the bag and the frisk of  
Drayton were both labeled as consensual acts. Reading the Drayton  
decision, trial judges would learn that police behavior has to be unusually 
coercive to constitute the type of pressure that mandates protections. 
Standard aggressive tactics of police in seeking cooperation from  
unwilling subjects do not even qualify as a search or seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Tracy Maclin pointed to two cases that “indicate that citizens no 
longer have the right to come and go as they please”:45 Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Delgado46 and Michigan v. Chesternut.47 After 
                                                     
 42. Id. at 211–12. 
 43. Id. at 203. 
 44. Id. at 198. (“I’m Investigator Lang with the Tallahassee Police Department. We’re  
conducting bus interdiction [sic], attempting to deter drugs and illegal weapons being transported on 
the bus. Do you have any bags on the bus?”) (alteration in original). 
 45. Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the 
Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1275 (1990). 
 46. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984). In Delgado,  
immigration officials investigated employee papers at a factory. According to the dissent, the  
investigation was conspicuously vigorous: 
[T]he surveys were carried out by surprise by relatively large numbers of agents,  
generally from 15 to 25, who moved systematically through the rows of workers who 
were seated at their work stations. Second, as the INS agents discovered persons whom 
they suspected of being illegal aliens, they would handcuff these persons and lead them 
away to waiting vans outside the factory. Third, all of the factory exits were  
conspicuously guarded by INS agents, stationed there to prevent anyone from leaving 
while the survey was being conducted. Finally, as the INS agents moved through the 
rows of workers, they would show their badges and direct pointed questions at the  
workers.  
Id. at 230. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that Herman Delgado, one of the workers questioned, 
was free to leave. “This conduct should have given respondents no reason to believe that they would 
be detained if they gave truthful answers to the questions put to them or if they simply refused to 
answer,” the majority reasoned. Id. at 218. In other words, to follow the Court’s dictates, a judge 
must refer to coercive conduct and aggressive tactics by police as noncoercive. 
 47. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988). 
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these cases, people “only have the right to be free from an  
unduly intimidating police presence.”48 
In Michigan v. Chesternut, police chased a civilian who ran when 
he saw their cruiser. Police testified that “the patrol car followed  
respondent around the corner ‘to see where he was going’” and “caught 
up with respondent and drove alongside him for a short distance.”49 On 
these facts, the chase did not amount to a Fourth Amendment seizure, 
held the Court. Police may chase civilians without any indicia of  
suspicion whatsoever without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment as 
long as the chase was no more intrusive than the one in this case.  
“Contrary to respondent’s assertion that a chase necessarily  
communicates that detention is intended and imminent, the police  
conduct involved here would not have communicated to the reasonable 
person an attempt to capture or otherwise intrude upon respondent’s 
freedom of movement.”50 It is difficult to imagine a more threatening act 
than being chased by armed men. Yet, the Supreme Court has decreed 
that when officers engage in a chase, it must be recharacterized as  
benign. 
Trayvon Martin had just turned seventeen. When determining 
whether behavior is coercive or benign, I suspect that most people would 
look at the victim’s characteristics.51 Thus, people would intuitively 
sense that an officer telling someone to “hop in the car” would be more 
coercive if said to a child than an adult. In other contexts, the Supreme 
Court has become increasingly aware of young people’s differences. 
There have been a plethora of studies of brain development, showing that 
there is a biological basis for immature behavior by teenagers, and these 
became the basis for holding that the death penalty may not be applied to 
juvenile offenders.52 In addition, studies have proven that youth are more 
vulnerable to police coercion in the context of interrogation.  
Exonerations due to the advent of DNA testing proved that false  
confessions were a major cause of wrongful convictions and that youth 
were particularly prone to confess even when innocent.53 However, the 
                                                     
 48. Maclin, supra note 45, at 1275 (citing Delgado, 466 U.S. and Chesternut, 486 U.S.). 
 49. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 569. 
 50. Id. at 574–75. 
 51. See Anne E. Supina, Jeffrey Snipes & Stephen Mastrofski, Compliance on Demand: The 
Public’s Response to Specific Police Requests, 33 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 269, 269–305 (1996). 
 52. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
 53. See Joshua A. Tepfer, Laura H. Nirider & Lynda M. Tricarico, Arresting Development: 
Convictions of Innocent Youth, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 887, 904 (2010) (analyzing exoneration data, 
finding that a third of the 103 youth exonerated, 31.1% of them, falsely confessed as compared to 
17.8% of the adults). 
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Fourth Amendment generally treats youth and adults the same when 
evaluating coercive police behavior. 
So far, the Supreme Court has never included age as a factor when 
determining if a reasonable person would feel free to walk away from a 
police encounter.54 Thus, when police officers accost minors on the street 
without physically restraining them, judges are likely to rule that what 
the police did was not a seizure at all and that age is irrelevant to that 
calculation. In fact, police departments that use the stop and frisk tactic 
extensively often target minors for this particular Fourth Amendment 
intrusion.55 
B. Supreme Court Tolerance of Racial Profiling 
“Though the death of Trayvon Martin was not the result 
of a law enforcement encounter, the issues of race and 
reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct are so closely 
linked in the minds of the public that his death cannot be 
separated from the law enforcement profiling debate.” 
- U.S. Congressman John Conyers, Jr.56 
Prosecutors in the George Zimmerman trial tried to portray  
Zimmerman as aggressive. They also sought to portray him as racially 
biased in the way the neighborhood watchman targeted and treated  
Martin, an African-American teenager who was on his way home from 
purchasing juice and candy when Zimmerman saw Martin and decided 
Martin was suspicious. This Article will demonstrate that when trial 
Judge Debra Nelson forbade the prosecution from using the term “racial 
profiling,” that ruling resonated with the Supreme Court’s particular set 
of rules regarding racial profiling in the context of the Fourth  
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
                                                     
 54. But see J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 280–81 (2011) (holding that age could 
factor into a judge’s determination of custody for purposes of applying Fifth Amendment Miranda 
rights and that a reasonable thirteen-year-old might view his circumstances differently than would a 
reasonable adult). Age may eventually become a proper factor in determining whether a reasonable 
person would feel free to ignore an officer’s requests and go about his or her business, but even so, it 
is unlikely to benefit someone like Trayvon Martin, who, at seventeen years old, is close to majority. 
 55. New York Civil Liberties Union noted that fifty-five percent of all stop and frisks were 
conducted on individuals aged fourteen to twenty-four, and eighty-seven percent of all stop and 
frisks were conducted on minorities. See New York Civil Liberties Union, Stop and Frisk Data 
NYCLU, http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data [https://perma.cc/Q3WB-EUHH]. 
 56. Lauren Fox, Racial Profiling Bill Gets Another Chance Because of Trayvon Martin, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 30, 2013, 1:48 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/ 
2013/07/30/racial-profiling-bill-gets-another-chance-because-of-trayvon-martin [https://perma.cc/ 
7DLS-9DNU]. 
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In 2002, William Stunz wrote that “[racial] profiling is the great  
issue of our time.”57 Indeed, the phrase “driving while black” is widely 
recognized to explain the phenomenon where police single out minorities 
for traffic stops, allowing white Americans to get away with their driving 
infractions; traffic law violations are nearly ubiquitous.58 The police 
practice of stopping minorities hugely out of proportion to their numbers 
in society—with the numbers of driving infractions or drug possession 
offenses demonstrably equal for white and black—raises serious Fourth 
Amendment concerns. The Fourth Amendment intended police to  
exercise individualized suspicion before curbing a person’s liberty.59 
Targeting someone based on group membership seems anathema to that 
principle. 
Although race-based policing is well-documented,60 the Supreme 
Court’s rulings allow it to flourish. The Court has taken two related  
approaches to racial profiling allegations in the context of searches and 
seizures that help the government defeat motions to suppress. In Whren 
v. United States,61 the Court established that racial profiling is not a  
cognizable claim within the Fourth Amendment, and, therefore, racially 
motivated seizures, although unconstitutional, will be tolerated as long as 
sufficient justification for the seizure exists once the offensive racial 
component is eliminated. A second, related approach is the color-blind 
analysis leveled by the Court in almost all Fourth Amendment cases, 
thereby obscuring the problem from public view.62 
                                                     
 57. William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2142 (2002). 
 58. See David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme 
Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 545 (1997).  
In the most literal sense, no driver can avoid violating some traffic law during a short 
drive, even with the most careful attention. Fairly read, Whren says that any traffic  
violation can support a stop, no matter what the real reason for it is; this makes any  
citizen fair game for a stop, almost any time, anywhere, virtually at the whim of police. 
Id. 
 59. See, e.g., Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 7 (1990); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 
(1989); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987). 
 60. Maclin, supra note 46, at 1324; see also Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and 
Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457 (2000). 
 61. 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). 
 62. Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 1033 
(2002). In a third approach, the Court declared that racial profiling is permitted in immigration  
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Thus, if a police officer pulls over a car near the border with Mexico seeking illegal immigrants, she 
may base the stop in part on the ethnic appearance of the car’s occupants. United States v.  
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886–87 (1975); see Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling After  
September 11: The Department of Justice’s 2003 Guidelines, 50 LOY. L. REV. 67, 70 (2004); see 
also Carrie L. Arnold, Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement: State and Local Agreements to 
Enforce Federal Immigration Law, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 113 (2007). 
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Almost thirty years before Whren, the Supreme Court  
acknowledged the prevalence of police harassment towards certain 
groups in Terry v. Ohio,63 but opined that nothing could be done to  
prevent this, because persons who violate the law would not be deterred 
by rules leading to the suppression of evidence.64 While Terry  
condemned race-based policing, the Court did not take this problem into 
consideration in balancing the interests of society in being free from 
crime against the society’s liberty interests. In Whren, the Court ducked 
the problem again, creating a situation where racial profiling is mostly 
invisible in published opinions but flourishes sub silento. 
Whren involved two black men in a car who were pulled over by 
vice officers dressed in plain clothes in an unmarked vehicle. The men 
were eventually charged and convicted of drug crimes. Under local  
regulations, plainclothes officers were permitted to make traffic stops 
“only in the case of a violation that is so grave as to pose an immediate 
threat to the safety of others.”65 The regulation was in place because 
plainclothes officers tended to provoke alarm and resistance from drivers 
who were pulled over.66 While it seemed clear that police stopped the car 
because they had a hunch they might find drugs, and that stopping a car 
on a hunch alone would violate the Fourth Amendment, one of the police 
officers testified that they wanted to investigate a traffic infraction. The 
officer stated that the driver was “not paying full time and attention to his 
driving” as shown by the fact that he stopped at a stop sign for more than 
twenty seconds.67 After reading the transcript from the Whren trial,  
Professor Kevin Johnson concluded that the trial judge was probably 
aware that there was a credibility problem here. Not only is the alleged 
infraction rarely ticketed, but during cross-examination on the motion to 
suppress the drugs, the officer was asked: “Isn’t it true that your decision 
to stop the Pathfinder was because you believed that two young black 
                                                     
 63. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 11 (1968). See generally Frank Rudy Cooper, The “Seesaw 
Effect” from Racial Profiling to Depolicing: Toward Critical Cultural Theory, in THE NEW CIVIL 
RIGHTS RESEARCH: A CONSTITUTIVE APPROACH 139 (Benjamin Fieury-Steiner & Laura B. Nielsen 
eds., 2006). 
 64. Terry, 392 U.S. at 14–15 (“The wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police 
community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain, will not be 
stopped by the exclusion of any evidence from any criminal trial.”). 
 65. Kevin R. Johnson, The Story of Whren v. United States: The Song Remains the Same, in 
RACE LAW STORIES 427 (Rachel P. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds., 2006) [hereinafter Johnson, 
The Song Remains the Same]; see Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the 
Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for 
Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005 (2010) [hereinafter Johnson, How Racial Profiling in 
America Became the Law of the Land]; see also Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual  
Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956 (1999). 
 66. Johnson, The Song Remains the Same, supra note 65, at 419. 
 67. Johnson, The Song Remains the Same, supra note 65, at 429 n.50. 
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men in a Pathfinder with temporary tags were suspicious; isn’t that 
true?” and before answering the question, the officer paused, “a lengthy 
pause,” the trial judge wrote.68 Nevertheless, the trial judge denied the 
motion to suppress because, ultimately, the driver committed two traffic 
infractions, turning without signaling and exceeding the speed limit, and 
the Supreme Court agreed that traffic infractions trump racial profiling in 
the Fourth Amendment context.69 Counsel for the two men had argued 
that if the Court permitted pretextual stops based on suspicion of drugs, 
then police could select drivers to pull over simply based on race.70 This 
argument was given short shrift in the Court’s unanimous opinion. The 
Supreme Court held that it did not matter whether the officers  
subjectively intended to pull the car over based on an impermissible 
hunch of drug possession because at the time they stopped the car, the  
police officer had probable cause to believe that the driver had  
committed a traffic offense. Nor did it matter if a reasonable officer in 
the position of the police officer in that case would not have stopped the 
car.71 With this one case the Court taught trial judges to tolerate racially 
motivated seizures in deciding motions to suppress as long as the police 
could point to a criminal act or traffic infraction to serve as a pretext for 
the police activity. 
The Whren decision also serves as an example of racial blindness. 
Although advocates for Whren and his co-defendant Brown focused on 
race and racial profiling, the opinion itself followed the usual colorblind 
approach of the Court, describing the facts without mentioning that 
Whren and his co-defendant were black.72 The only time race was 
brought into the opinion was when the Court dismissed the argument that 
the Fourth Amendment should prevent police from targeting civilians 
based on race.73 In a seminal article on the Fourth Amendment, Professor 
Devon Carbado at UCLA School of Law provided a critical race theory 
critique of Whren: 
The Court’s racialization of the facts is not merely descriptive; it is 
performative, making race appear and disappear, relevant and  
                                                     
 68. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land, supra note 65, at 
1053–55; see also David O. Markus, Whren v. United States: A Pretext To Subvert the Fourth 
Amendment, 14 HARV. BLACK LETTER L.J. 91, 107 (1998) (“The [Whren] Court, in light of the 
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 69. See sources, supra note 68. 
 70. Johnson, The Song Remains the Same, supra note 65, at 432. 
 71. Id. This was what counsel for Whren and Brown unsuccessfully argued to the D.C. Circuit 
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 72. Carbado, supra note 62, at 981. 
 73. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). 
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irrelevant . . . With words, the Court recognizes Whren’s race to  
deny him remediation and de-recognizes his race to deny the  
“important” police function blackness performs as a proxy for  
suspicion.74  
Not only does the Supreme Court render racial profiling beyond the 
reach of Fourth Amendment remedy, but it also employs racial blindness 
to pretend that these officers did not actually engage in racial profiling. 
This sends a message to lower court judges to be wary of acknowledging 
racial profiling even in cases where it would be difficult not to see. 
Whren v. United States aided Zimmerman’s defense in two ways.75 
First, following Whren, judges have learned to exclude allegations of 
racial profiling or racialized policing from motions to suppress. Citing 
United States v. Armstrong, a case decided the same year as Whren that 
rolled back opportunities to pursue civil remedies for racial police  
practices, Kevin Johnson noted that, taken together, “Armstrong and 
Whren effectively immunize police from any challenges for race-based 
law enforcement conduct; only the most egregious police misconduct 
will likely be subject to sanction.”76 As Professor Johnson77 wrote: 
“Lower courts fastidiously follow Whren, and prosecutors frequently 
invoke the holding as immunizing the conduct of police officers.”78 
Second, the Whren Court continued a colorblind approach whereby 
courts render racial discrimination invisible when evaluating police  
behavior. After Terry v. Ohio, almost all Supreme Court Fourth  
Amendment decisions have eschewed racial description in favor of 
colorblindness.79 Even cases that were previously discussed, such as 
Mendenhall80 and Drayton,81 involved African-American civilians, but 
                                                     
 74. Carbado, supra note 62, at 981. In addition, Carbado explained that the Supreme Court’s 
colorblind approach intentionally blocks certain social meanings. Were the Court to reference the 
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their race is absent from the majority opinions. “Proponents of  
colorblindness,” explains Cynthia Lee, may think that this is a moral  
imperative, but, in fact, “[p]retending that race does not matter, which 
the principle of colorblindness encourages, only exacerbates the problem 
of implicit bias.”82 
The Fourth Amendment proves informative here. Without setting 
out to apply search and seizure law to the murder trial before her, Judge 
Nelson would have been eminently familiar with the rulings governing 
constitutional police behavior. In the Fourth Amendment context, for the 
past twenty years the Court has consistently excluded racial bias from 
consideration in determining if the police behaved appropriately.83  
Although a volunteer, not a police officer, killed Trayvon Martin, if 
Judge Nelson viewed Zimmerman as part of the police team, then her 
rulings make sense. 
II. THE INVISIBLE HAND OF THE SUPREME COURT IN GEORGE 
ZIMMERMAN’S MURDER TRIAL 
“If an officer stops you, promise me you’ll  
always be polite 
And that you’ll never ever run away 
Promise Mama you’ll keep your hands in sight”84 
Bruce Springsteen wrote this song about Amadou Diallo, who was 
killed by police in a hail of forty-one bullets, and he later dedicated it to 
Trayvon Martin. 
A. Evidence Presented to Prove Murder or Manslaughter 
On February 26, 2012, Trayvon Martin lay face down on the 
ground with a bullet hole through his heart.85 The seventeen-year-old was 
                                                     
 82. Lee, supra note 21, at 1610. 
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dead in Sanford, Florida. This was not a case of “who done it?” George 
Zimmerman, age twenty-eight, had pulled the trigger. The question was 
“why?” After a two-month delay, Zimmerman was charged with  
second-degree murder and manslaughter,86 and a six-week trial  
commenced on June 10, 2013, about fifteen months after the alleged 
murder.87 In the end, the jury had to evaluate Zimmerman’s claim that in 
shooting Trayvon Martin, he was simply defending himself against  
deadly force by the unarmed teenager. This Section will lay out the trial 
in enough detail to allow the reader to comprehend the context and  
importance of two rulings made by the trial judge that benefited the  
accused. 
Trayvon Martin was a visitor to the gated community in Sanford, 
Florida, visiting his father and his father’s fiancé. On the day of the  
alleged murder, Martin left the townhouse to go to a local shop. At the 
time of his death, the teenager was carrying a packet of Skittles and a can 
of Arizona brand juice.88 
On that fateful evening, Zimmerman was a volunteer, a self-titled 
watch “captain,” patrolling the neighborhood in a car, looking for people 
who might be engaged in criminal activity.89 Although the National  
Sheriffs’ Association recommends that neighborhood-watch volunteers 
not carry weapons, Zimmerman was legally carrying a concealed  
semiautomatic, nine-millimeter pistol.90 In contrast, Trayvon Martin was 
                                                                                                                       
 85. Lizette Alvarez, Martin Was Shot as He Leaned Over Zimmerman, Court Is Told, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/us/teenager-was-over-zimmerman-as-
he-was-shot-expert-says.html?_r=0 (“The bullet, he said, entered his heart from the front, in a left to 
right direction, and plunged into one of his lungs.”). 
 86. This charge is also referred to as involuntary manslaughter. For a discussion of the  
elements of these charges, see infra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. 
 87. Jury selection commenced June 10, 2013, and the jury reached a verdict on July 25, 2013. 
See Erin Donaghue, George Zimmerman Verdict: Former Neighborhood Watch Leader Not Guilty 
in Death of Fla. Teen Trayvon Martin, CBS NEWS (July 14, 2013, 3:21 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/george-zimmerman-verdict-former-neighborhood-watch-leader-not-
guilty-in-death-of-fla-teen-trayvon-martin/ [https://perma.cc/TPA7-5E3T]. 
 88. While it is often misreported that Trayvon had iced tea, this is because his juice was the 
Arizona brand that is mostly known for its tea. The prosecution at trial called it juice. See Yamiche 
Alcindor, Experts: Prosecutors Failed to Humanize Trayvon, USA TODAY (July 16, 2013, 3:44 
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/07/16/zimmerman-trayvon-juror-
b37/2521529/ [perma.cc/V2Y5-XJPX]. 
 89. Others have laid out the facts of the shooting in more detail. See Trymaine Lee, George 
Zimmerman Neighbors Complained About Aggressive Tactics Before Trayvon Martin Killing, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 12, 2012, 9:13 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/12/george-
zimmerman-trayvon-martin_n_1340358.html [https://perma.cc/7AJS-LAXD]. 
 90. See Dennis A. Henigan, The Woollard Decision and the Lessons of the Trayvon Martin 
Tragedy, 71 MD. L. REV. 1188, 1189 n.4 (2012) (“Although a legal gun carrier under Florida law, 
Zimmerman was armed in violation of the neighborhood watch program rule that members ‘shall not 
carry weapons.’” The National Sheriff’s Association neighborhood-watch volunteer manual states: 
“It should be emphasized to members that they do not possess police powers and they shall not carry 
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unarmed. Martin was talking on the phone until moments before he was 
killed.91 
At approximately seven o’clock in the evening, Zimmerman saw 
Martin after the boy had left the store and was walking around, talking 
on his cell phone.92 Zimmerman did not know Martin but decided he was 
a criminal based on almost no facts other than that Martin was a black 
youth wearing a sweatshirt with the hood up, walking in the rain. Calling 
the police, Zimmerman told the dispatcher that he saw “a real suspicious 
guy . . . This guy looks like he’s up to no good . . . It’s raining and he’s 
just walking around, looking about.”93 During the 911 call, Zimmerman 
told the police that the “suspect” was running away from him and that 
“these a-holes they always get away.”94 When Zimmerman admitted to 
the dispatcher that he was following the victim in his car, the dispatcher 
told Zimmerman to stop following the young man and to wait for  
police.95 
About three minutes after Zimmerman finished the 911 call, a  
single gunshot was heard. Zimmerman fired one bullet at close range, 
and it went into Martin’s chest. Martin was pronounced dead at the  
scene.96 
                                                                                                                       
weapons or pursue vehicles.”). Beth Kassab, Trayvon Martin Would Be Alive if Neighborhood Watch 
Rules Followed, ORLANDO SENT. (Mar. 14, 2012, 7:41 PM), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/ 
2012-03-14/news/os-trayvon-martin-beth-kassab-031512-20120314_1_orlando-police-block-
captains-zimmerman [https://perma.cc/DHL2-NAJ6]. Yet Zimmerman’s watch group was not  
registered with the National Sheriff Association and while the Sanford Police Department may have 
orally instructed Zimmerman not to carry a weapon while on patrol, it is not clear whether this  
happened. Jonathan Kaminsky, Neighborhood Watch Groups Ponder Use of Guns After Zimmerman 
Trial, WASH. POST (July 28, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/neighborhood-watch-
groups-ponder-use-of-guns-after-zimmerman-trial/2013/07/28/a00f3248-f79f-11e2-afc1-
c850c6ee5af8_story.html [https://perma.cc/C6WZ-VH6W]. 
 91. Dan Barry et al., In the Eye of a Firestorm: In Florida, an Intersection of Tragedy, Race 
and Outrage, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2012), at A1. See generally, Croakerqueen123, George Zimmer-
man Trial, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qsgtFBN8uKs&list= 
PLYEBn4w1XOIeEsjIiyfTohqC6BQLI81vx [https://perma.cc/A92M-F4B3]. 
 92. Julia Dahl, Trayvon Martin Shooting: A Timeline of Events, CBS NEWS (July 12, 2013, 
5:11 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/trayvon-martin-shooting-a-timeline-of-events/ 
[https://perma.cc/PSQ5-AXA7]; see also Jeannine Bell, Can’t We Be Your Neighbor? Trayvon  
Martin, George Zimmerman, and the Resistance to Blacks as Neighbors, 95 B.U. L. REV. 851, 853 
(2015). 
 93. Transcript of George Zimmerman’s Call to the Police, contributed by Sam Baldwin, 
MOTHER JONES, http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/326700-full-transcript-zimmerman.html 
[https://perma.cc/PX6W-RHAB] [hereinafter Transcript of Zimmerman Call]. 
 94. See id. at 2. Note that the actual transcript reads “assholes.” 
 95. Id. at 2. 
 96. “They found Martin ‘face down in the grass.’” A sergeant checked and could not find a 
pulse. For the next six minutes, he and another police officer teamed up to conduct CPR on the teen. 
A plastic bag, brought by a neighbor, was used to seal his chest wound. Firefighters and EMS from 
the Sanford Fire Department arrived at 7:27 p.m., to continue efforts to try to save him. Three 
minutes later, at 7:30 p.m., Martin was pronounced dead. See Greg Botelho, What Happened the 
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What occurred during the three minutes between the Zimmerman’s 
911 call and the fatal gunshot was hotly disputed at trial. The prosecution 
wanted the jury to infer that Zimmerman caught up to Martin, confronted 
him aggressively, and when Martin fought back, defending himself, 
Zimmerman fired his weapon into Martin’s chest. This, the prosecution 
contended, portrayed an indifference to human life, thereby proving  
second-degree murder.97 Alternatively, the prosecution wanted the jury 
to find that Zimmerman’s behavior in firing his gun into the unarmed 
youth was grossly negligent, thereby proving the lesser charge of  
involuntary manslaughter.98 
Much of the government’s case rested on testimony by Trayvon 
Martin’s teenage friend, Rachel Jeantel, who was talking to Martin on 
the phone when Zimmerman began following him. Martin complained to 
Jeantel that a “creepy-ass cracker” was following him.99 Jeantel  
responded that the man was probably a pervert.100 She recounted that 
Martin had tried to run away and was out of breath. Martin’s final words 
before the phone went dead were “Get off. Get off.”101 
                                                                                                                       
Night Trayvon Martin Died, CNN (May 23, 2012, 10:48 AM), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2012/05/18/justice/florida-teen-shooting-details/ [https://perma.cc/2HRK-2QB6]. 
 97. To prove the crime of second-degree murder under the depraved heart doctrine, the  
government need not prove that George Zimmerman intended Trayvon Martin’s death. Florida  
requires the State to prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Zimmerman 
committed an act or series of acts that: (1) a person of ordinary judgment would know is reasonably 
certain to kill or do serious bodily injury to another; (2) is done from ill will, hatred, spite or an evil 
intent; and (3) is of such a nature that the act itself indicates an indifference to human life.  
FLA. STAT. tit. XLVI, § 782.04(2) (2013). 
 98. For involuntary manslaughter the government need not show ill will, but “only an intent to 
commit an act that was not merely negligent, justified, or excusable and which caused death.” See 
Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes of Indifference, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 105, 121–22 (1996) (“In most 
states, involuntary manslaughter requires proof of grossly negligent conduct causing death, such that 
the offender should have realized the conduct represented a substantial and unjustifiable risk to 
human life. The individual need not have been aware of the risk provided that a reasonable person in 
the same situation would have been.”) (emphasis added). See FLA. STAT. tit. XLVI, § 782.07 (2013) 
for instructions on Manslaughter. In Florida, unlike some other jurisdictions, a defendant may be 
convicted of manslaughter if they have an honest but unreasonable belief in the need to act in  
self-defense. 
 99. Danielle Cadet, Rachel Jeantel, Trayvon Martin Friend: Teen Was Trying to Escape 
George Zimmerman, HUFFINGTON POST (June 27, 2013, 5:26 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/26/rachel-jeantel-trayvon-martin_n_3505587.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z44B-BYRX ] (video and transcript). 
 100. Rachel Jeantel stated that the cracker reference meant pervert. See Yamiche Alcindor, 
Trayvon Martin’s Friend: Encounter Was Racially Charged, USA TODAY (June 27, 2013), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/27/trayvon-martin-sanford-zimmerman-
florida-race/2462403/ [https://perma.cc/ZN2T-94WC]. In closing argument, prosecution pointed to 
the telephone discussion about whether the man following Trayvon, Zimmerman, was “like a  
sex-pervert” to show that Trayvon was scared. 
 101. Cadet, supra note 99. 
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In a much-criticized move, the prosecution introduced  
Zimmerman’s self-serving statements into court.102 The government 
brought in the defendant’s statements to show that Zimmerman lied 
about what happened and that the physical evidence contradicted his  
story. However, this tactic meant that Zimmerman could mount a  
self-defense claim without exposing himself to the perils of  
cross-examination. Anyone who testifies is subject to cross-examination, 
but Zimmerman had no need to take the stand to testify once the jury 
heard what he said to police. Under the rules of evidence, a criminal  
defendant may not introduce self-serving out-of-court statements, but 
here the prosecutor was the one who introduced them. In effect,  
Zimmerman’s out-of-court statements replaced live testimony, testimony 
whose veracity was never tested through the caldron of  
cross-examination. 
Defense counsel benefited from the government’s blunder by using 
Zimmerman’s self-serving statements to police after the shooting to  
construct a claim of self-defense. Although Zimmerman admitted to  
police that he got out of his car, he claimed that Martin attacked him and 
that he was afraid Martin would kill him at the time he fired his gun.  
According to Zimmerman’s statements, after Mr. Zimmerman got out of 
his car, “Mr. Martin soon emerged from the darkness and punched him, 
knocking him to the ground, suffocating him and then repeatedly bashing 
his head onto concrete while menacing him with the words ‘You’re  
going to die tonight.’”103 Zimmerman told police that Martin grabbed for 
Zimmerman’s gun, but Zimmerman grabbed it first. Zimmerman fired 
into Martin’s chest as Martin leaned over him because the defendant 
feared for his own life. 
In order to show that he had the right to use deadly force against 
Trayvon Martin, Zimmerman documented some injuries to his face, 
nose, and back of his head in support of his self-defense theory.  
However, while this evidence established that Zimmerman was involved 
in a physical fight, it did not prove who started the altercation nor did it 
establish that deadly force was necessary. While the defense argued that 
the injuries proved Zimmerman was in fear for his life at the time he 
                                                     
 102. See Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecution’s Biggest Mistake in Zimmerman Trial, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 10, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bennett-l-gershman/ 
prosecutions-biggest-mistake_b_3573932.html [https://perma.cc/U66K-DDSD]; see also Jarvis 
DeBerry, Did George Zimmerman’s Prosecutors Try to Get Him Off?, TIMES–PICAYUNE (July 15, 
2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2013/07/did_george_zimmermans_ 
prosecut.html [https://perma.cc/2GE7-QPPN]. 
 103. Cara Buckley, Jury Hears Zimmerman’s Recorded Account of Night of Fatal Shooting, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/us/jurors-hear-zimmermans-taped-
police-interview.html?_r=1&. 
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pulled the trigger, the government argued that the injuries did not support 
Zimmerman’s story about being pummeled repeatedly on concrete. One 
area where the physical evidence appeared to strongly contradict  
Zimmerman’s story was the state of the teenager’s body. Martin was 
found dead with his hands underneath his body. Zimmerman had told 
police that he pulled Martin’s hands off him and “moved [his] hands 
apart.”104 At trial the defense tried to show that Martin might have moved 
his own hands after the bullet pierced his heart and lodged in his lung. A 
Washington Post editorial noted this weakness in Zimmerman’s  
self-defense claim: 
But it strains credulity to believe that Trayvon could move his 
hands, which Zimmerman said he stretched away from Trayvon’s 
body, to underneath his body, as a witness and Sanford police  
officer Ricardo Ayala noted. And all of this supposedly happened 
between the time Trayvon was shot and the time the first neighbor 
and first officers arrived. The elapsed time was about a minute.105  
The verdict turned on the credibility of Zimmerman’s statements to 
police: whether the jury believed that Martin came at him from behind to 
start punching him; whether they believed that the unarmed Martin told 
Zimmerman he was going to “die tonight”; whether they believed Martin 
was leaning over Zimmerman at the time Zimmerman shot a bullet into 
his chest; and whether Zimmerman’s head was pounded twenty-five 
times into the concrete pavement. According to one juror who spoke to 
the press afterwards, the original vote in the jury room was tied, with 
three for acquittal and three for conviction.106 After deliberating for over 
sixteen hours, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty on both charges. 
B. Zimmerman Behaved Like a Police Officer 
Although Zimmerman was not a police officer, he was doing police 
officer type of work: patrolling the neighborhood, looking for suspects, 
and reporting suspicious behavior, to name the key similarities. In his 
written statement to police, Zimmerman used police language, referring 
to Martin as a “suspect” nine times, the way police would in writing a 
                                                     
 104. Tom Winter, James Novogrod & Elizabeth Chuck, Gunshot Wound Expert: Evidence 
Supports Zimmerman’s Account of Fatal Encounter, NBC NEWS (July 9, 2013), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/gunshot-wound-expert-evidence-supports-zimmermans-
account-fatal-encounter-v19375277 [https://perma.cc/8JNC-8NFJ]. 
 105. Jonathan Capehart, Trayvon Was ‘Alive,’ but Could He Move?, WASH. POST (July 8, 
2013), 2013 WLNR 16516955. 
 106. Dana Ford, Juror: ‘No doubt’ that George Zimmerman Feared for His Life, CNN (July 
16, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/15/justice/zimmerman-juror-book/ [https://perma.cc/NL56-
RJNL] (“An initial vote was divided. Three of the jurors first voted Zimmerman was guilty, while 
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report.107 Defense attorneys brought in evidence of burglaries in the 
neighborhood to justify Zimmerman’s targeting of Martin. His attorneys 
thereby suggested that Zimmerman kept track of crimes as police officers 
are trained to do and that Zimmerman’s motives in following Martin 
were the same as any uniformed officer. 
One place where there appears to be different rules for the police 
who kill is in the arrest and charging decisions. In Zimmerman’s case, 
the government declined to charge him until the media attention and  
public outcry made Martin’s death too costly to ignore. There was a  
forty-six-day delay before George Zimmerman stood accused of  
murdering Martin.108 “When there is a dead victim and police know who 
killed the victim, they usually arrest the obvious perpetrator of the  
homicide and then investigate.”109 However, when police officers are the 
ones who kill a suspect, the officers may not be arrested at all, and  
prosecutors may decline to file criminal charges. 
Consider the killing of twenty-two-year-old Amadou Diallo by four 
New York City police officers. He was unarmed when they shot him  
forty-one times. When the police refused to arrest or charge the officers 
who shot the unarmed man, there were public protests.110 It took  
fifty-five days for the police officers involved in the killing to finally 
face charges.111 
                                                     
 107. Jane Velez-Mitchell, Was George Zimmerman a Cop Wannabe?, CNN (July 3, 2013), 
http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1307/03/ijvm.01.html [https://perma.cc/V88W-D3SD]. 
Investigator Doris Singleton read Zimmerman’s written statement where Zimmerman referred to 
Martin as a suspect nine different times: 
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suspect got on top of me. The suspect told me, ‘Shut the [expletive deleted] up.’ The  
suspect slammed my head into the sidewalk.  
Id.  
 108. Trayvon Martin was killed on February 26, 2012, and charges were brought on April 11, 
2012. Lizette Alvarez & Michael Cooper, Prosecutor Files Charge of 2nd-Degree Murder in  
Shooting of Martin, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/12/us/ 
zimmerman-to-be-charged-in-trayvon-martin-shooting.html?; see Lawson, A Fresh Cut in an Old 
Wound, supra note 19, at 287. Zimmerman faced life imprisonment on the second-degree murder 
charge. FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (2012). 
 109. Lee, supra note 21, at 1566. 
 110. Michael Cooper, 12 Arrested During Sit-In to Protest Diallo Killing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
10, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/10/nyregion/12-arrested-during-sit-in-to-protest-diallo-
killing.html. 
 111. Jane Fritsch, The Diallo Verdict: The Overview; 4 Officers in Diallo Shooting Are  
Acquitted of All Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/26/ 
nyregion/diallo-verdict-overview-4-officers-diallo-shooting-are-acquitted-all-charges.html? 
pagewanted=all&src=pm. On March 31, 1999, the four cops who murdered Amadou Diallo were 
charged with two counts of second-degree murder. See New York: Protests Denounce Police Murder 
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The killing of Amadou Diallo is a stark example of police privilege 
at work both before and after indictment. Defense counsel argued that 
officers shot Diallo in self-defense because they believed Diallo was 
reaching for a gun rather than his wallet. Before trial, eighty-one percent 
of prospective jurors polled “believed [that] there was ‘no justification 
possible’ for the police officers’ firing 41 shots at Mr. Diallo.”112  
However, the trial was moved to a different venue. 
As in Zimmerman’s case, prosecuting Amadou Diallo’s killers  
required government lawyers to mentally switch sides. Instead of  
defending police aggression as they generally do, prosecutors had to 
switch to condemning it. Likewise, with racial bias, government lawyers 
had to mentally switch from defending racial profiling to excoriating it. 
As in Zimmerman’s case, Bronx prosecutors sought to show that the  
police officials had racially profiled Diallo when they initially confronted 
him.113 During closing arguments, the prosecution argued that the police 
officers “had caused the fatal confrontation by prejudging Mr. Diallo as a 
possible rapist or robber, and never considering that Mr. Diallo might 
have had a right to be on the stoop.”114 Their attempts to use racial  
profiling against the officers were unsuccessful. Jurors acquitted all four 
officers, demonstrating how the strength of police privilege continued 
beyond the initial charging decision into the trial itself.115 
Similarly, in the police shooting of Sean Bell in Queens, New York, 
in 2006, those responsible for Bell’s death faced no charges until  
mounting public outrage made it impossible for the government to ignore 
the killing. The night before he was to marry, Bell held a bachelor party 
at a nightclub in Queens. When Bell left the club and entered his car with 
                                                                                                                       
of Amadou Diallo, REVOLUTIONARY WORKER (April 11, 1999), http://www.revcom.us/a/v20/1000-
1009/1001/diallo.htm [https://perma.cc/ZF7D-SDU7].  
If [the cops were] convicted of the most serious murder charge they face 25 to life in 
prison. Since 1995, the police in New York City have murdered almost 200. Only a very 
few of these cops have ever been charged with any crimes. In the past 15 years, none has 
ever been charged with murder . . . Since Amadou Diallo was killed on February 4 a 
storm of protest against police brutality has engulfed the city. As the weeks went on and 
the cops still were not arrested, were not questioned, and were allowed to work at desk 
jobs, the anger of the people continued to rise. 
Id.  
 112. See Amy Waldman, A Lawyer’s Legal Victory Goes Against an Old Haunt, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 18, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/18/nyregion/a-lawyer-s-legal-victory-goes-
against-an-old-haunt.html. 
 113. Fritsch, supra note 111. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. (“Their lawyers laid much of the blame for the shooting on Mr. Diallo himself, saying 
he had behaved suspiciously and had not obeyed the officers’ commands to stop.”); see Joanne  
Armstrong Brandwood, You Say “Fair Trial” and I Say “Free Press”: British and American  
Approaches to Protecting Defendants’ Rights in High Profile Trials, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1412 
(2000). 
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three friends in the early hours of the morning, three  
plainclothes police officers followed them and approached Bell’s car 
with guns drawn. When Bell accelerated the car, the three police officers 
fired fifty shots into Bell’s car, killing Bell and severely injuring two of 
his companions. Immediately after the shooting, no arrests were made, 
not until thousands of people protested the police officers’ use of 
force.116 Comparing the Bell shooting to that of Amadou Diallo, New 
York City mayor Michael Bloomberg called the shooting “inexplicable” 
and “unacceptable,”117 and New York governor George E. Pataki also 
criticized the officers’ use of force.118 It took almost six months after the 
shooting for the three police officers to face formal charges.119 
As with Diallo’s shooters, the officers who killed Sean Bell were all 
acquitted. Criticizing the verdict, Delores Jones-Brown, director of the 
Center on Race, Crime and Justice at John Jay College of Criminal  
Justice, noted that the accused police officers received special treatment 
from the judge in the non-jury trial.120 Certainly, the government  
established second-degree murder for “two of the four officers [who] 
fired forty-two bullets[—]nearly ten times the number fired on average 
by members of the department in other incidents,” Professor  
Jones-Brown opined.121 This “should certainly equate to depraved  
indifference.”122 “Surely, it would have if forty-two bullets were fired by 
two gang members under similar circumstances.”123 The verdict in the 
Sean Bell case likewise indicates that police officials charged with  
violent offenses receive privileged treatment. 
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2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/30/nyregion/30kelly.html?ex=1322542800&en= 
2d61f9274f496d2a&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss. Eventually the officers, although not 
arrested, were put on paid administrative leave and stripped of their weapons. 
 119. Fritsch, supra note 111. 
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RIGHTS MAG. 6 (2009). Jones-Brown criticized the trial judge for acquitting Sean Bell’s killers: 
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George Zimmerman arguably received special treatment from the 
police when they allowed him to walk away from the police station after 
he confessed to killing the unarmed high school student. While Trayvon 
Martin’s race likely played a part in the decision not to initially charge 
Zimmerman, another case, the Jordan Davis shooting, illustrates that race 
alone does not ensure privileged treatment. Michael Dunn, a white man, 
killed a black seventeen-year-old teenager the same year that  
Zimmerman killed Trayvon Martin.124 Dubbed “the loud music case” by 
the media, Dunn fired ten shots into an SUV containing three black  
teenagers after an argument about the volume on the SUV’s radio and 
then claimed self-defense and invoked Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” 
laws. Dunn claimed he believed that he saw the barrel of a gun in the 
back window of the SUV as one of the teens, seventeen-year-old Jordan 
Davis, started to get out of the vehicle, but no gun was found.125 Davis 
died at the scene. Unlike Zimmerman, Dunn was arrested for killing an 
unarmed teenager, and prosecutors did not delay charging him. In fact, 
prosecutors leveled first-degree murder charges against Dunn. Although 
Dunn’s jury deadlocked on the first-degree murder charge, it convicted 
him of four charges, including three counts of attempted second-degree 
murder.126 While there were more egregious facts surrounding Dunn’s 
use of lethal force than Zimmerman’s, it is noteworthy that Dunn was 
neither a police officer nor a neighborhood-watch volunteer, and he did 
not receive police privilege. 
Police are notorious for protecting their own, even to the extent of 
lying under oath.127 Some attribute this loyalty to the “thin blue line” 
mentality, meaning the unwritten rule that police look out for other  
police believing they are what prevent our society from spiraling into 
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 127. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 836 (2008) (“In New 
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anarchy.128 The police who investigated Zimmerman helped him in  
myriad ways beyond refusing to arrest him. As Tamara Rice Lave wrote, 
“[T]he police did not vigorously investigate the shooting but instead  
deferred to Zimmerman’s account.”129 Even the botched preservation of 
DNA evidence by detectives might be attributed to this deferential  
treatment. 
During Zimmerman’s trial, prosecutors sought to use Zimmerman’s 
desire to be a police officer against him. Prosecutors tried to portray 
Zimmerman as a “wannabe cop” and “vigilante” who racially profiled 
Martin.130 The government introduced evidence in their case in chief that 
the defendant took courses in law enforcement and called the professor 
who taught him criminal procedure to testify to this. Despite the  
government’s attempts to put a pejorative spin on these facts,  
Zimmerman’s connection to the police arguably helped his defense. 
One example of police assistance for Zimmerman during the trial 
was the testimony of the Sanford police officer that questioned  
Zimmerman after the shooting. On direct examination, Officer  
Christopher Serino testified that he found Zimmerman was telling the 
truth about being attacked by Martin,131 even though the rules of  
evidence do not permit witnesses to give such opinions.132 In  
run-of-the-mill prosecutions, police witnesses rarely, if ever, offer  
unsolicited testimony to sway the jury in favor of the accused. What 
makes this testimony particularly troublesome is that the sole reason the 
government introduced Zimmerman’s statements was to show that he 
lied to police and here was an officer calling him truthful. Moreover, the 
police officer commented on the central issue for the jury, namely  
Zimmerman’s justification for using deadly force. As I presented this 
                                                     
 128. Errol Morris, The Thin Blue Line, PARAMOUNT PRODUCTIONS (1988); see Susan Bandes, 
Tracing the Pattern of No Pattern: Stories of Police Brutality, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 665, 679 (2001) 
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 129. Lave, supra note 19, at 854. 
 130. Before opening statements, Judge Debra Nelson forbade the government from using the 
phrases “wannabe cop,” “vigilante,” and “racial profiling” in their opening. See Cara Buckley,  
Zimmerman Judge Bars Testimony on 911 Call, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/23/us/zimmerman-judge-bars-testimony-on-911-call.html. 
 131. Yamiche Alcindor, Officer Testimony No Slam Dunk for Zimmerman Prosecutors, USA 
TODAY (July 2, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/07/02/zimmerman-
trayvon-martin-murder-trial/2482325/ [https://perma.cc/EA5M-9YJ2]. 
 132. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.404 (West 2016). 
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issue to various audiences, no defense attorney could remember a police 
officer vouching for a civilian defendant’s credibility during a criminal 
trial, let alone a murder trial. 
Apparently, Zimmerman’s investigating officer viewed  
Zimmerman as a member of the police team, thereby affording the 
neighborhood-watch volunteer a certain amount of police protection even 
during the trial. Consequently, it is easy to imagine that other players in 
the trial, notably the prosecutors and the judge, would similarly view 
Zimmerman as part of the police team. Once the judge viewed  
Zimmerman as part of the police team, it would be a natural next step to 
apply search and seizure law to the encounter on a conscious or  
unconscious basis. 
C. Controversial Ruling No. 1: The Trial Court Bars Prosecutors from 
Arguing that Zimmerman “Racially Profiled” Martin 
The first controversial ruling by the trial judge came before trial 
started, when defense counsel moved to prevent the government from 
alleging that Zimmerman racially profiled the young man whom he later 
killed.133 Judge Debra Nelson ruled for the defense, forbidding the  
government from using the phrases “wannabe cop,” “vigilante,” and, 
most importantly, “racial profiling” to describe Zimmerman’s motives 
and behavior.134 This ruling came before the opening arguments and 
therefore altered what the jury would hear throughout the trial.  
Prosecutors were allowed to state that Zimmerman “profiled” Martin, but 
not that he “racially profiled” him.135 
Profiling and racial profiling are not synonymous concepts, as  
Deborah A. Ramirez, Jennifer Hoopes, and Tara Lai Quinlan explained: 
“The term ‘profiling’ refers to the ‘police practice of viewing certain 
characteristics as indicators of criminal behavior.’ Profiling is now an 
established law enforcement practice that incorporates social science 
theory and statistical methodology into crime solving strategies.”136 In 
contrast, racial profiling involves the use of “race, ethnicity, national 
                                                     
 133. See Buckley, supra note 130. 
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 135. See Lisa Bloom, Zimmerman Prosecutors Duck the Race Issue, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 
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 136. Deborah A. Ramirez et al., Defining Racial Profiling in a Post-September 11 World, 40 
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origin, or religion as one of several factors in determining whom to stop, 
search, or question” and is generally not accepted by the public.137  
Although some politicians refer to racial profiling as a stop based solely 
on race or ethnicity, in fact, race may be one of many factors, as long as 
“race is part of the calculus of suspicion.”138 Quoting Randall Kennedy, 
Hoopes and Quinlan agree that “racial profiling occurs whenever police 
routinely use race as a negative signal that, along with an accumulation 
of other signals, causes an officer to react with suspicion.”139 Racial  
profiling is often a product of unconscious police biases rather than  
intentional bigotry. 
It was not a stretch for the government to accuse Zimmerman of  
racial profiling.140 After all, Zimmerman first fixated on the young  
Martin due to little else besides that he was a black youth wearing the 
hoodie of his sweatshirt to cover his head in the rain. Although it is often 
condemned, racial profiling is currently ingrained in American policing. 
One sociology study found that police officers “know which  
communities are whiter, blacker (or more minority), or some  
combination of the two and where in their own community racial, ethnic, 
and class composition differ . . . . [Who is stopped] is inextricably tied 
not only to race, but to officers’ conception[s] of place, of what should 
typically occur in an area and who belongs, as well as where they  
belong.”141 Arguably, law enforcement police the same  
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 141. See Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 66 (2009) 
(“Such ‘commonsense geography’ informs their decisions about whom to deem ‘out of place,’ which 
in turn send expressive messages about who belongs and who does not.”); see also Albert J. Meehan 
& Michael C. Ponder, Race and Place: The Ecology of Racial Profiling of African American  
Motorists, 19 JUST. Q. 399, 402 (2002). 
2016] Cops on Trial 33 
segregation boundaries that Congress outlawed fifty years ago.142 This 
standard policing method could easily describe  
Zimmerman’s thought process as he patrolled seeking to identify those 
who might be thieves or burglars.143 
Since there was so much evidence from which a jury could infer 
that Zimmerman engaged in racial profiling when he singled out Martin 
as a suspect, it is surprising that the trial judge prevented the government 
from arguing that Zimmerman racially profiled Martin. Ordinarily,  
prosecutors are given wide latitude to establish a defendant’s motive. 
Murder trials are often filled with evidence that the defendant was racist 
or biased in some way that would provide a motive for the criminal  
behavior. For example, in the trial of John William King for the murder 
of James Byrd of Texas, the prosecution succeeded in introducing the 
defendant’s racist tattoos and arguing that this proved a racial motive in 
the killings.144 Bias against a particular subset of people would ordinarily 
be considered fair game in a murder trial.145 
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What the Brain Saw: The Case of Trayvon Martin and the Need for Eyewitness Identification  
Reform, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 333, 337 (2012); Frances Robles, Shooter of Trayvon Martin a  
Habitual Caller to Cops, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 19, 2012), 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/crime/article24726289.html [http://perma.cc/937P-8LBP]. 
 144. Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Violence/Reconstructing Community, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
809, 826 (2000). 
 145. See David P. Leonard, Character and Motive in Evidence Law, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 439 
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While it is possible that the term “profiling” may have been  
interpreted as racial profiling by jurors, the term profiling is considered 
standard police methodology and does not carry the pejorative message. 
Meanwhile, racial profiling is condemned despite the fact that it is still 
practiced.146 Zimmerman’s prosecutors wanted to take advantage of  
public sentiment condemning racial profiling. Had the judge allowed it, 
the racial profiling label might have displaced the defense narrative that 
Zimmerman was upholding the law by patrolling.147 Also, a juror who 
believes that Zimmerman used race as a proxy for criminality is more 
likely to deduce that Zimmerman did not interact with Martin in the 
friendly way he treated the white neighbor who testified on  
Zimmerman’s behalf about a conversation they had about a break-in.148 
Rather, someone who racially profiles is likely to treat a young black 
man as a bully or bigot would—aggressively. 
There is an intrinsic connection between racial profiling and  
aggressive policing, even when the bias is unconscious. As Andrew 
Taslitz wrote, there is an “escalating cycle of aggression” that starts with 
the “unconscious process of stereotyping and selective inattention,” a 
“presumption . . . not simply that a black suspect committed a particular 
crime, but rather that black character is paradigmatically criminal and 
deceptive.”149 Taslitz goes on to explain the circular nature of this  
problem: 
                                                     
 146. Kary L. Moss & Daniel S. Korobkin, Destination Justice, 80 MICH. B.J. 36, 40 (2001) 
(“[A] 1999 nationwide Gallup poll on the subject sought to define racial profiling in terms as neutral 
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Police therefore use more intense—and riskier—investigative  
techniques when having contact with black suspects. But those  
suspects are more likely than white ones to react to such pressure 
defensively. That reaction leads the officers to be still more  
suspicious of their subject, leading them in turn to still more  
aggressive policing tactics.150  
Zimmerman’s trial showcased the connection between race and  
policing; this was not just a question of whether Zimmerman harbored 
racial bias in initially selecting Martin, but how Zimmerman behaved 
once the two of them stood face-to-face. 
Whether Zimmerman’s behavior represented unconscious bias or 
purposeful stereotyping, the racial dimension to his fixation on Martin 
was clearly relevant to the charges. Motive is what divides murder from 
manslaughter and what separates mistake from aggression in the  
self-defense context. Nevertheless, the trial judge decided that it would 
be unfair to Zimmerman for the prosecutors to assert that Zimmerman 
racially profiled Martin. 
In the usual paradigm, excluding race from consideration helps the 
government defeat a criminal defendant’s motion to suppress evidence or 
motion to dismiss. But excluding the racialized nature of Zimmerman’s 
focus on Martin as a suspect helped the defense and hindered the  
government. Removing race from the trial may have had negative  
subconscious effects on the jurors’ thought processes. As Cynthia Lee 
observes, the social science literature on race salience demonstrates that 
when race is highlighted, jurors tend to treat similarly situated black and 
white defendants equally; when race is not made salient, jurors tend to 
favor white defendants and be more condemning of black defendants.151 
In addition, prosecutors wanted to shape perceptions of Zimmerman’s 
motive for attacking Martin, and if the allegation stuck, it might have 
diminished Zimmerman’s credibility.152 At the very least, Zimmerman’s 
prosecutors were hampered by a ruling that prevented them from  
communicating their allegations directly and succinctly to the jury. 
To follow the color-blind tradition mandated by the Supreme 
Court’s Fourth Amendment approach, judges might exclude any mention 
of racial profiling. One judge who refused to ignore racial profiling did 
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so at her own peril. On August 12, 2013, after a trial on the merits,  
District Judge Shira Scheindlin ruled that New York City police  
stop-and-frisk policy systematically violated the rights of citizens.153 
Judge Scheindlin’s decision in Floyd v. City of New York154 was largely 
based on the fact that the practice primarily targeted young men of color, 
although she also found that police often lacked the appropriate level of 
suspicion.155 Relying on statistics collected by the police department, 
Judge Scheindlin concluded that the discriminatory practice violated both 
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and the Fourth 
Amendment and issued a remedial order. In considering an appeal from 
the city, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit took the unusual step of removing Judge Scheindlin from the 
case.156 
The Circuit Court panel explained that they removed Judge 
Scheindlin from the case for two reasons; although, on closer  
examination, neither reason holds water.157 First, she participated in three 
media interviews, even though the judge did not speak about any pending 
cases during those interviews. Second, the panel questioned her  
implementation of the related cases rule, when Judge Scheindlin advised 
plaintiffs before her in one stop-and-frisk lawsuit to mark a second racial 
profiling stop-and-frisk lawsuit “related” on the file so it would be routed 
to her court.158 While the panel expressly refused to find any judicial 
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misconduct or ethical lapse, they concluded, “the appearance of [her] 
impartiality” might reasonably be questioned.159 Generally, matters of 
recusal are handled before the judge in question.160 In the case of Floyd, 
neither party asked the judge to recuse herself so there was no record 
from which the appellate panel could make its determination. 
Ironically, removing an independent judge who behaved properly, 
when the panel insists they found no wrongdoing, itself creates the  
appearance of impropriety; namely, the appearance that the sanctions are 
a consequence of her controversial rulings.161 The removal created the 
appearance that Judge Scheindlin was punished for being explicit about 
race instead of colorblind. Nancy Gertner, a former federal district court 
judge, commented, “If there is bias here, it is that of the 2nd Circuit that 
went out of its way to disqualify a judge—outside of the normal  
processes.”162 Backlash or not, the panel’s decision sent a message that if 
this could happen to a federal judge, then all judges must be wary of  
acknowledging the existence of racialized policing. 
In Zimmerman’s case, the judge’s decision may be understood as a 
combination of race and policing, rather than race alone. The case law on 
search and seizure serves to create a different set of rules for police, who 
allegedly engage in aggressive and even violent behavior, than for  
civilians. The case law on racial profiling helps insulate police further. If 
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the judge viewed Zimmerman as a part of the police team, then it would 
make sense that she excluded racial bias from the jury’s consideration. 
D. Controversial Ruling No. 2: The Trial Court Refuses to Instruct the 
Jury on the Rule of Aggressors 
Judge Nelson’s second controversial ruling, and the more  
significant one, occurred at the end of the Zimmerman trial at a  
conference regarding proposed jury instructions. During the jury  
instruction conference, prosecutors asked the judge to inform the jury 
that aggressors lose their right to self-defense.163 It is a standard rule that 
an initial aggressor cannot claim self-defense. In fact, the rule of  
aggressors is central to the concept of self-defense.164 The Florida  
instruction sought by the Zimmerman prosecution team reads as follows: 
Use of force by aggressor—The justification [self-defense]  
described in the preceding sections of this chapter is not available to 
a person who: 
(2) Initially provokes [by force or the threat of force]165 the use of 
force against himself or herself, unless: 
(a) Such force is so great that the person reasonably believes that 
he or she is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and 
that he or she has exhausted every reasonable means to escape such 
danger other than the use of force which is likely to cause death or 
great bodily harm to the assailant; or 
(b) In good faith, the person withdraws from physical contact with 
the assailant and indicates clearly to the assailant that he or she  
desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force, but the assailant 
continues or resumes the use of force.166  
Zimmerman’s defense team orally moved to block the provocation 
instruction, pointing to a 2001 case named Gibbs v. State167 that  
                                                     
 163. TheCount.com, George Zimmerman Trial Jury Instructions Argument Pt. 8, YOUTUBE 
(July 11, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1_UY18DMHV4 [http://perma.cc/WA8K-
3K7K] [hereinafter TheCount.com, Jury Instructions Pt. 8]. 
 164. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4 (2d ed. 2003). LaFave’s  
definition of justifiable use of force (emphasis added): 
One who is not the aggressor in an encounter is justified in using a reasonable amount of 
force against his adversary when he reasonably believes (a) that he is in immediate  
danger of unlawful bodily harm from his adversary and (b) that the use of such force is 
necessary to avoid this danger.  
 165. Language about force or threat of force was added by the author because the Florida  
District Court of Appeals narrowed the definition of provocation in 2001. See Gibbs v. State, 789 So. 
2d 443, 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
 166. FLA. STAT. § 776.041 (2011). 
 167. Gibbs, 789 So. 2d at 444. 
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narrowed Florida’s previously expansive definition of provocation. The 
court in Gibbs reasoned that a jury might understand the word  
provocation to include “any provocation by the defendant—no matter 
how slight or subjective the provocation. By that standard, a mere insult 
could be deemed sufficient to prohibit defending oneself from an  
attacker.”168 Thus, Gibbs held that when instructed on self-defense, jurors 
should be told that an aggressor is one who initially provokes the other 
party “by force or the threat of force.”169 While Zimmerman’s  
prosecutors were happy for the jury to receive the Gibbs instruction,  
defense counsel wanted no instruction at all, arguing that the jury was 
given no credible evidence that Zimmerman used force or threat of force 
against Martin that night.170 Zimmerman’s lawyers argued that certain 
witnesses were not credible, urging the judge to ignore their testimony 
when determining if the prosecution had introduced evidence from which 
a reasonable juror could infer that Martin was provoked.171 
The prosecution had the better argument in support of the aggressor 
instruction: that credibility is generally a matter for the jury to decide172 
and that the state had a right to this instruction since it had set forth  
evidence upon which a jury could find provocation.173 Specifically, the 
prosecution pointed to (1) evidence that the defendant followed the  
victim in his car; (2) evidence that Zimmerman pursued Martin even  
after he was told not to and that the victim even told his friend on the 
phone that he was being pursued; (3) testimony from a couple of  
witnesses who heard the scuffle; (4) testimony from the victim’s friend 
that she specifically heard Martin tell Zimmerman to get off of him; and 
(5) testimony from an eye witness who saw the defendant on top of  
Martin, before he heard the gunshot.174 
After hearing arguments from counsel for both prosecution and  
defense, Judge Nelson declined to give the instruction that people who 
provoke an assault cannot claim self-defense unless certain conditions 
                                                     
 168. Id. at 445. 
 169. Id. at 444. That would have excluded a racial slur but permitted a jury to find that Gibbs 
slapped the victim before the victim hit her. 
 170. TheCount.com, George Zimmerman Trial Jury Instructions Argument, YOUTUBE (July 
11, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ma-coEcsCg [http://perma.cc/MSM8-95VP]  
[hereinafter TheCount.com, Jury Instructions Pt. 6]. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See, e.g., United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973) (“[Th]e jury is the 
lie detector in the courtroom.”); United States v. Ward, 169 F.2d 460, 462 (3d Cir. 1948) (It is 
“axiomatic that the ‘expert’ may not go so far as to usurp the exclusive function of the jury to weigh 
the evidence and determine credibility.”). 
 173. See TheCount.com, Jury Instructions Pt. 6, supra note 170. 
 174. Id. 
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are met.175 This ruling meant that prosecutors also could not argue to the 
jury that Zimmerman forfeited his right to self-defense because he  
provoked the fight. The judge did not give a reason for her decision. 
This ruling was surprising since Florida law supported the  
prosecutor’s request. According to case law, a court should provide the 
state with an aggressor instruction on request whenever there is  
“evidence in the record that [the defendant] may have initially provoked 
the use of force against himself.”176 The provocation must be either “by 
force or the threat of force.”177 In addition, Gibbs did not direct judges to 
evaluate the credibility of the government witnesses before determining 
if there was evidence of provocation in the record. 
As in many murder trials, Zimmerman’s prosecutors lacked direct 
proof of the defendant’s actions leading up to Martin’s death, but had 
this been an ordinary case, there would have been more than enough  
evidence of provocation to allow an instruction. The prosecution was 
                                                     
 175. See TheCount.com, Jury Instructions Pt. 8, supra note 163. Judge Nelson did not state her 
reasons on the record, leaving room for speculation regarding the basis for her decision, simply 
stating, “The court is not going to give it.” Id.  
 176. Johnson v. State, 65 So. 3d 1147, 1149 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). Historically, Florida 
erected a broad barrier to those who sought to invoke the self-defense shield. “One may not provoke 
a difficulty and having done so act under the necessity produced by the difficulty, then kill his  
adversary and justify the homicide under the plea of self defense.” Mixon v. State, 59 So. 2d 38, 39 
(Fla. 1952). In 1974, Florida law codified the Florida common law rule in a statute:  
The justification described in the preceding sections of this chapter [self-defense] is not 
available to a person who . . . initially provokes the use of force against himself or  
herself, unless (a) Such force is so great that the person reasonably believes that he or she 
is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that he or she has exhausted  
every reasonable means to escape such danger other than the use of force which is likely 
to cause death or great bodily harm to the assailant; or (b) In good faith, the person  
withdraws from physical contact with the assailant and indicates clearly to the assailant 
that he or she desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force, but the assailant  
continues or resumes the use of force.  
FLA. STAT. § 776.041 (2016). The definition of “provoke” was narrowed in Gibbs (holding that 
jurors should be told that an aggressor is one who initially provokes the other party “by force or the 
threat of force”); see Gibbs, 789 So. 2d at 444. 
 176. Gibbs, 789 So. 2d at 444. 
 177. Id. at 443. Zimmerman’s defense counsel relied upon Gibbs to support his argument that 
Judge Nelson should not give an aggressor jury instruction at all in his trial. Zimmerman’s counsel 
argued that the certain witnesses were not credible, urging the judge to ignore their testimony when 
determining if the prosecution had introduced evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer 
that Trayvon Martin was provoked. Credibility, however, is generally a matter for the jury to decide. 
Ironically, the decision in Gibbs was designed to rectify a racially suspect verdict, where a white jury 
convicted a black woman, possibly based on a racial slur defendant made in response to the victim’s 
use of the “N” word. Id. The Court in Gibbs opined: “The facts of this case are a sad and disturbing 
reminder of the tragic consequences that racial conflict can lead to.” Id. at 444. There was no  
analogous danger of racial overreaching in Zimmerman’s trial. In fact, the danger went the other 
way, that a mostly white jury might view the dead victim as provoking his own fate based on racial 
stereotypes. 
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correct to point to the fact that Martin ran away from Zimmerman,178 a 
fact established by the defendant’s own statements to the 911 operator 
and corroborated by Rachel Jeantel’s testimony. Jeantel’s testimony  
supported the claim that Martin ran because he felt threatened by the 
“creepy” man following him.179 Beyond the prosecutor’s recital of facts, 
the judge could have acknowledged that jurors could make an easy  
inference that Zimmerman continued to pursue Martin after the  
dispatcher told him to stop following his “suspect.” For one, Zimmerman 
refused to meet the police officer at his home or at a set location,  
suggesting Zimmerman planned to continue pursuing his target.180  
Second, Zimmerman’s state of mind suggested someone who would  
continue the chase when he told the dispatcher “these a-holes they  
always get away.”181 Pursuit alone should be enough to establish a threat 
of force,182 but there was also evidence of actual force. Jeantel testified 
                                                     
 178. One Florida case, Mixon v. State, 59 So. 2d 38 (1952), foreshadowed Zimmerman’s claim 
of self-defense despite his initial pursuit of the victim. In Mixon, the victim was walking down a 
road away from the defendant after an argument. Defendant Mixon pursued the victim by car, armed 
with a gun, and ended up shooting him. Like Zimmerman, the defendant Mixon claimed  
self-defense. At trial he testified that the victim was beating his head against the steering wheel when 
Mixon shot him. Upholding the murder verdict, the appeals court explained that “the facts believed 
by the jury point too strongly to a deliberate pursuit by appellant, after the original difficulty had 
ended and the parties had separated.” Mixon, 59 So. 2d at 39. Although Mixon predates the Florida 
appellate decision in Gibbs that narrowed provocation to force or threat of force, Mixon appears to 
be good law insofar as it defines the timing of the provocation. Although Florida cases require the 
provocation to be “contemporaneous,” this language should not have precluded prosecutors from 
using Zimmerman’s pursuit of Trayvon Martin. See Johnson, 65 So. 3d at 1149 (the aggressor  
statute “‘precludes the initial aggressor from asserting self-defense where he or she is the individual 
who provoked the use of force’ contemporaneously to the actions of the victim to which the  
defendant claims self-defense.”). However, even as the court used the term “contemporaneous,” it 
applied it to a situation where the alleged provocation occurred two or three hours before the assault 
for which the defendant was charged. 
 179. Note that there was no evidence that Trayvon Martin knew Zimmerman was armed. Even 
if Martin realized Zimmerman had a weapon, the Supreme Court imagines that people are not afraid 
of armed police, as long as the guns are holstered. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 194 
(2002); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 432 (1991) (using the fact that officers never 
removed their guns from zippered clear plastic pouches that they held in their hands as a factor to 
conclude that the defendant was not seized in the constitutional sense). 
 180. See Transcript of Zimmerman’s Call, supra note 93. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Stalking laws generally recognize that a man’s pursuit of an individual despite being 
informed of the victim’s desire to be left alone could be viewed as a threat of force by the victim. 
See Susan M. Dennison & Donald M. Thomson Griffith, Criticisms or Plaudits for Stalking Laws? 
What Psycholegal Research Tells Us About Proscribing Stalking, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
384, 392 (2005) (“Given the plethora of behaviors that fall under the ambit of stalking, debates have 
centered on the relevance of the intentions of the perpetrator, the question of when arousing fear in 
another is reasonably foreseeable, and whether the consequences to the victim should be an essential 
element in the law.”); see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: The Meaning of Gender Equality in 
Criminal Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2 (1994). But Florida’s stalking laws specifically 
exempt someone in George Zimmerman’s situation who calls the police. 
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that after Martin stopped running, she heard him ask, “Why are you  
following me?” and she heard Martin yell, “Get off! Get off!” seconds 
before the phone went silent.183 This constitutes evidence on the record 
that Zimmerman used actual force and was therefore an initial aggressor. 
Witnesses heard screams, and while there was conflicting testimony 
about whether the screams came from Martin or Zimmerman, jurors 
could reasonably find that it was Martin screaming for help.184 Moreover, 
by referring to Martin as an “a-hole,” Zimmerman demonstrated a state 
of mind suggesting that he was hostile and aggressive rather than  
peaceful or meek when he made contact with Martin minutes later. 
Hence, Judge Nelson’s ruling that the jury was not entitled to consider 
whether Zimmerman was an initial aggressor ran counter to the evidence. 
There was sufficient evidence for jurors to find that Zimmerman pursued 
Martin, who was innocent and unarmed, and that Martin simply stood his 
ground against his pursuer, as Florida law permits. 
Denying the instruction struck at the heart of the prosecution’s case. 
When Zimmerman raised a self-defense claim, it placed the burden on 
the prosecution to prove that Zimmerman was not in imminent fear of 
death or great bodily harm, or that the defense was unavailable to  
Zimmerman because he was the initial aggressor. Zimmerman could 
have regained his right to self-defense by arguing that Martin was only 
entitled to use nondeadly force and escalated the confrontation by using 
deadly force. Nevertheless, even if Zimmerman regained his right to  
self-defense during the scuffle, he would still lose his right to stand his 
ground. The Stand Your Ground instruction, as read, influenced at least 
one juror toward guilt.185 Because of the way that the Stand Your Ground 
                                                     
 183. See Evan S. Benn & Audra D.S. Burch, Trayvon Martin’s Childhood Friend Back on the 
Witness Stand in Zimmerman Trial, MIAMI HERALD (June 27, 2013), 
http://www.nfvzone.com/news/2013/06/27/7237848.htm [https://perma.cc/8RNK-5AKV] (noting 
that Rachel Jeantel “is one of the prosecution’s most important witnesses because she bolsters the 
contention that George Zimmerman was the aggressor in his confrontation with 17-year-old  
Martin”); see also Amanda Sloane & Graham Winch, Key Witness Recounts Trayvon Martin’s Final 
Phone Call, CNN (June 27, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/26/justice/zimmerman-trial/ 
[http://perma.cc/WHR3-YJLA] (noting witness testimony where Rachel Jeantal recalled hearing 
Trayvon Martin say “Get off, get off!”). Although no one saw whether Zimmerman grabbed Martin, 
Martin’s “get off” plea only makes sense if Zimmerman grabbed Martin or got on top of him. 
 184. Trayvon Martin Case 911 Call: Screams Not George Zimmerman’s, 2 Experts Say, NBC 
NEWS (Mar. 31, 2012), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/04/01/10963191-trayvon-martin-
case-911-call-screams-not-george-zimmermans-2-experts-say?lite [http://perma.cc/4UXT-LCSV]. 
 185. The jury only heard the Stand Your Ground instructions and nothing about how to evalu-
ate an aggressor’s claim to self-defense. One juror interviewed stated that the Stand Your Ground 
instructions helped sway her towards a not guilty verdict. However, this juror also claimed that she 
had to acquit even for manslaughter because the prosecution did not prove Zimmerman’s intent to 
kill Martin. Alyssa Newcomb, George Zimmerman Juror Says “In Our Hearts We Felt He Was 
Guilty”, ABC NEWS (July 25, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/US/george-zimmerman-juror-
murder/story?id=19770659 [http://perma.cc/UEE2-4GQ3] (Juror B29 tells Robin Roberts: “But as 
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statute intersects with the aggressor rules, there were legal consequences 
if the jury thought Zimmerman initiated the confrontation.186 Thus, when 
the judge declined to give the aggressor instruction, she deprived the jury 
of one avenue to reject Zimmerman’s self-defense claim and eliminated 
jury deliberation about which person was the aggressor and who,  
therefore, had the right to stand his ground. 
As the judge gave no explanation for her ruling, either orally or in 
writing, the reader is left to surmise what might have influenced her to 
disregard the prosecution’s evidence of aggressive behavior. Ultimately, 
the judge’s ruling prevented the jury from determining if Zimmerman, 
rather than Martin, provoked the deadly violence and if Martin had a 
right to stand his ground. 
E. Unconscious Influence on Trial Judges 
“The human mind . . . is not simply a complex organ:  
it is a collection of complex organs each serving a  
separate purpose, each operating according 
 to its own rules.”187 
                                                                                                                       
the law was read to me, if you have no proof that he killed him intentionally, you can’t say he is 
guilty.”). In fact, the jury was instructed that manslaughter was proved if George Zimmerman  
intentionally committed an act or acts that caused the death of Trayvon Martin. The act, such as the 
shooting, must be intended, while the result, death, need not be intended. Thus, the juror did not 
fully comprehend the jury instructions, and was overly swayed by the accumulation of instructions 
on stand your ground and self-defense that benefited the defendant. Thus, it well could have made a 
difference to the outcome if Stand Your Ground language had been offset by language about initial 
aggressors. 
 186. Jurors were instructed that there was no duty to retreat as long as three requirements were 
met: (1) Zimmerman was not engaged in unlawful activity; (2) Zimmerman had a right to be where 
he was at the time he was attacked; and (3) if deadly force was used, the force was necessary to 
prevent death or great bodily harm. Accord Novak v. State, 974 So. 2d 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) 
(“If the defendant was not engaged in an unlawful activity and was attacked in any place where [he] 
[she] had a right to be, [he] [she] had no duty to retreat and had the right to stand [his] [her] ground 
and meet force with force, including deadly force, if [he] [she] reasonably believed that it was  
necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to [himself] [herself] [another] or to prevent 
the commission of a forcible felony.”) (citing In re Std. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases (2006-3), 
947 So. 2d 1159, 1161 (Fla. 2007)). There is an interesting interplay between the Stand Your Ground 
instructions and the aggressor instructions. Aggressors are deprived their right to use deadly force if 
they can retreat in safety. Thus, for aggressors the rule reverts back to the way it was before Stand 
Your Ground was implemented in 2005. Before Stand Your Ground, a person using deadly force in 
Florida “must have used all reasonable means in his power, consistent with his own safety, to avoid 
the danger and to avert the necessity of taking human life.” See Lave, supra note 19, at 832 (citing 
Baker v. State, 506 So. 2d 1056, 1058 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)). That is still what an aggressor 
must do before he uses deadly force. 
 187. JUDITH RICH HARRIS, NO TWO ALIKE, HUMAN NATURE AND HUMAN INDIVIDUALITY, at 
ix (2006); see also Barry Ravech, On Being Certain: Believing You Are Right Even When You’re 
Not, 93 MASS. L. REV. 364, 370 (2011) (reviewing ROBERT A. BURTON, ON BEING CERTAIN: 
BELIEVING YOU ARE RIGHT EVEN WHEN YOU’RE NOT (2008)).  
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As in most criminal trials, the trial judge in Zimmerman’s case 
made most of her rulings quickly, ruling from the bench after hearing 
oral arguments from counsel. This included the two controversial rulings 
discussed in Sections C and D above. In the first ruling, Judge Nelson 
prevented the prosecutor from arguing that Zimmerman racially profiled 
Martin. In her second ruling, Judge Nelson refused to instruct the jury on 
the law that generally denies aggressors the right to self-defense. Since 
the trial judge did not explain these rulings, it is useful to review what is 
known about unconscious decision-making to determine whether  
repeated exposure to Supreme Court cases regarding police power may 
have influenced her view of the evidence. 
Trial judges make many decisions quickly. Social scientists have 
referred to this style of decision-making as “blinking.” Blinking refers to 
“quick, heat-of-trial decisions”188 as opposed to the slower process of 
deliberation often applied to “matters submitted and taken under  
advisement.”189 Implicit cognition science predicts that “actors do not 
always have conscious, intentional control over the processes of social 
perception, impression formation, and judgment that motivate their  
actions.”190 Unconscious or subconscious influences shape the way  
human beings reach decisions, and judges are not immune from this  
process.191 Research suggests that implicit cognition or biases affect  
deliberate decisions as well as quick, intuitive ones, although appellate 
judges who have more time to deliberate may correct their intuition if 
they recognize and seek to overcome known unconscious biases. As  
Professor W. Bradley Wendel wrote, “instead of worrying about crooked 
judges, we should worry about decent judges who are susceptible to the 
same sorts of cognitive errors that affect the rest of us.”192 
                                                     
 188. Hon. John F. Irwin & Daniel L. Real, Unconscious Influences on Judicial  
Decision-Making: The Illusion of Objectivity, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 2–5 (2010); see also Chris 
Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 27–28 
(2007) (“[J]udges rely heavily on their intuitive faculties . . . [w]hen awarding damages, accessing 
liability based on statistical evidence, and predicating outcomes on appeal . . . .”). 
 189. Id. at 7 (arguing that even deliberative decisions reached after the passage of time and 
careful consideration may be impacted by the judges’ implicit biases). 
 190. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 
945, 946–47 (2006) (arguing that actors may not be aware that they hold particular biases). 
 191. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1195, 1221 (2009); see also Irwin & Real, supra note 188, at 7 (“It seems reasonable 
to expect that implicit biases could have a significant impact on the decisions made by judges,  
regardless of whether those decisions are quick and intuitive, or slow and deliberative.”). 
 192. W. Bradley Wendel, The Behavioral Psychology of Judicial Corruption: A Response to 
Judge Irwin and Daniel Real, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 35, 39 (2010) (“Reliance on fast, automatic 
processing is a pervasive feature of human decision-making. Errors sometimes result from the  
influence of these System 1 processes, and because they are mostly unconscious, judges may not be 
aware of the errors they are making.”). 
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Implicit biases can form early in a person’s life, or they can come 
from repeated exposure later in life.193 While there are no tests to see 
how repeated reading of case law influences judges, the closest analogy 
is probably exposure to the media, including exposure to newspapers and 
magazines. The media plays a role in how we “map” external stimuli.194 
According to Professor Perry Moriearty, when reports of juvenile  
delinquency and crime dominated the local news in the 1990s, these  
stories affected the criminal justice system by entering the viewers’  
subconscious.195 Media works on the unconscious and without the  
viewer’s knowledge; subliminal messages are downloaded.196 Studies 
such as the “Mug Shot Test” reported that when a black suspect’s mug 
shot is briefly highlighted in a crime news report, white participants 
showed six percent more support for enhanced punishment than did the 
control group which saw no crime story.197 Illinois Appellate Court  
Justice Michael B. Hyman reviewed the literature on pernicious  
influences, writing that “the pervasiveness of implicit bias can be  
surprising, particularly to those who pursue impartiality by profession—
namely judges.”198 
Much of the research on judicial bias has focused on biases that are 
harmful to goals of fairness and equal treatment, such as race or gender 
bias.199 But biases extend well beyond these categories and “need not 
                                                     
 193. Siri Carpenter, Buried Prejudice, 19 SCI. AM. MIND 33, 35 (2008) (“Whatever the neural 
underpinnings of implicit bias, cultural factors—such as shopworn ethnic jokes, careless catch 
phrases and playground taunts dispensed by peers, parents or the media—often reinforce  
prejudice.”). 
 194. Perry L. Moriearty, Framing Justice: Media, Bias, and Legal Decision-Making, 69 MD. L. 
REV. 849, 887–88 (2010) (“Problems arise . . . when the material presented by the media is  
imbalanced or inaccurate. When the images transmitted by the media are distorted, the racial  
meanings in our schemas become distorted.”). 
 195. Id. at 852. 
 196. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1557 (2005). 
 197. See Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. et al., Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local Television News 
on the Viewing Public, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 560, 563–67 (2007) (“The principal objective of the test 
was to manipulate the main elements of the crime news script. Four levels of the manipulation were 
established. First, some participants watched a story in which the alleged perpetrator of a murder 
was an African-American male. Second, other subjects were given the same news report, but this 
time featuring a white male as the murder suspect. A third set of participants watched the news  
report [which] excluded . . . the identity of the perpetrator. Finally, a control group saw no crime 
news story at all. The Black and White suspects were represented by the same digitized picture then 
painted to alter skin color leaving the suspects’ features identical. White participants’ exposure to the 
black perpetrator had the greatest impact (6%) on support for punitive policies.”). Kang, supra note 
196, at 1492. 
 198. Justice Michael B. Hyman, Implicit Bias in the Courts, 102 ILL. B.J. 40, 41–42 (2014). 
 199. Deborah Ruble Round, Gender Bias in the Justice System, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2193, 2194 
(1988) (“In the judicial system, gender bias results in decisions or actions that are based upon  
preconceived notions of sexual roles rather than on fair and impartial appraisals of individual  
situations.”); Marsha S. Stern, Courting Justice: Addressing Gender Bias in the Judicial System, 
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have a pejorative connotation.”200 Implicit biases must simply be  
recognized as “unconscious attitudes and correlations that are formed by 
one’s life experiences and that lurk beneath the surface of the  
conscious.”201 Intuitive associations between “thunder and rain, for  
instance, or gray hair and old age” involve implicit cognition without the 
pejorative connotations.202 Media can also unconsciously influence  
viewers in a positive way. Implicit bias studies demonstrate that viewing 
images can improve attitudes towards minorities by exposing people to 
content containing positive role models.203 Thus, a judge who associates 
black men with crime may actively counter that bias with images of  
Martin Luther King, Jr. and other positive images of black men.204 Thus, 
repeated exposure in life may create or change implicit associations. If 
repeated exposure to media and photographs can change judicial  
attitudes, then it stands to reason that repeated exposure to case law 
could influence a judge’s thinking as well. Arguably, Supreme Court 
decisions would influence judges even more than media, since judges not 
only read the cases, but they apply the law found in those cases.  
Moreover, if they do not apply the case law they read, they risk reversal 
on appeal. 
Trial judges generally make decisions regarding the scope of police 
power in the context of criminal prosecutions where defendants move to 
suppress evidence against them. Judges must also apply this  
jurisprudence in civil rights lawsuits where plaintiffs sue the police and 
other government actors for violating the Fourth or Fifth Amendments. 
Motions to suppress are filed in a substantial percentage of criminal  
                                                                                                                       
1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1, 22 (1996) (“Gender bias in the judicial system has the potential to have a 
multi-level impact involving: a) harm to the individual; b) harm to the judicial proceeding; and c) 
harm to the system as a whole.”); see also Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 
48 (1994) (“[R]acial and ethnic bias may operate as a factor in disproportionate treatment of  
minorities during plea bargaining, jury selection through use of peremptory challenges, the adequacy 
of defense representation and in setting of bail.”). 
 200. Irwin & Real, supra note 191, at 2 (explaining the term “bias” should not be perceived as 
wholly negative); see also Greenwald et al., supra note 190, at 950 (“[Bias] accurately denotes a 
displacement of [one’s] responses along a continuum of possible judgments.”). 
 201. See Irwin & Real, supra note 191, at 4. 
 202. Id. at 3. See also Mahzarin R. Banaji et al., How (Un)Ethical Are You?, HARV. BUS. REV. 
81, no. 12 (2003) (“Early on, we learn to associate things that commonly go together and expect 
them to inevitably coexist: thunder and rain, for instance, or gray hair and old age.”). 
 203. Kang, supra note 196, at 1553–54; see also Nilanjana Dasgupta et al., On the Malleability 
of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked  
Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCH. 800, 807 (2001) (“[E]xposure to liked members of 
a devalued group and disliked members of a valued group may create new abstract representations of 
target groups without erasing the old ones. These new knowledge structures may influence automatic 
attitudinal responses as long as they remain accessible.”). 
 204. Rachlinski et al., supra note 191, at 1226 (posting portrait of President Obama alongside 
the [pictures] of mostly white male judges in many courtrooms is a stereotype-incongruent model). 
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cases, and thus, the judge would be steeped in the case law and exposed 
regularly to arguments and testimony that relate to that case law. Judges 
would also be expected to apply that case law to the facts before them 
with some regularity. 
Recognizing that much decision-making occurs on an unconscious 
level, it follows that trial judges who have internalized the Fourth 
Amendment case law will unconsciously apply it when making decisions 
in the heat of trial. This is especially likely where the factual situation at 
trial closely mirrors the factual patterns found in search and seizure  
opinions, such as following or subduing a suspect. Repeated exposure to 
acceptable aggressive police behavior could make a judge view  
aggressive police officer behavior differently than similar behavior by an 
ordinary criminal defendant. Similarly, judges are likely to associate 
claims of racial profiling in a trial with claims of racial profiling asserted 
in pre-trial motions. Even if judges had time to deliberate and take a  
formal approach using syllogistic reasoning,205 they may wish to treat 
like things alike. In other words, if police are allowed to be aggressive in 
one context, it may seem unfair to permit the government to criminalize 
that same behavior in another context. If police are implicitly permitted 
to racially profile suspects in one context, it may seem unfair to allow the 
government to stigmatize that behavior as racist in another context. Thus, 
it need not even be pro-police bias that influences judges to bestow  
privileges for criminal defendants who are connected to law enforcement 
but simply intuitive association between police and power, similar to 
gray hair and old age. 
Because a neighborhood watch captain, not a police officer, killed 
Trayvon Martin, the trial judge would unconsciously attribute police 
privilege to Zimmerman only if she saw the defendant as part of the  
police team. What makes the police privilege theory appealing is how 
well her rulings dovetail with Fourth Amendment precedent. For  
example, the defense team provided no legal support for their oral  
request to bar the government from mentioning racial profiling. But 
while allegations of racial bias are routinely permitted in murder trials to 
prove motive, the Fourth Amendment excludes racial motive arguments 
whenever there is probable cause to justify the seizure or search.  
Moreover, the trial judge’s influences may have been more unconscious 
than conscious. The motion to prevent the term “racial profiling” was 
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argued during a pretrial hearing before opening statements.206 Judge  
Nelson did not take it under advisement but ruled right from the bench. 
According to the bias studies, this type of decision-making corresponds 
to a blinking or intuitive reasoning process.207 
Similarly, when Judge Nelson was asked to exclude the law on 
provocation from the jury’s consideration, this was done during a bench 
conference where there was no time for the “staring” or deliberative 
model of judging. In fact, Judge Nelson was surprised by the defense’s 
move to exclude the jury instruction, for their written submission had 
made it appear that the defense team merely sought to include the  
narrowing language from the Gibbs decision, and Judge Nelson  
expressed her willingness to grant that request.208 Ruling in favor of the 
prosecution, Judge Nelson declined to give a reason for excluding the 
jury instruction on the rule of aggressors, simply announcing from the 
bench: “The Court is not going to give it.”209 
While Florida self-defense case law contravened Judge Nelson’s 
decision on provocation, her ruling fits well with Supreme Court Fourth 
Amendment precedent. For example, under Fourth Amendment case law, 
a police officer in George Zimmerman’s shoes would be permitted to 
chase Martin in order to investigate even unsupported suspicions. In fact, 
as we saw in Chesternut, that behavior would be deemed noncoercive as 
a matter of law.210 Moreover, if the judge thought that a police officer in 
Zimmerman’s position had reasonable suspicion to believe Martin was 
planning to commit a crime, then the law empowers officers to  
physically grab and detain the suspected wrongdoer until the suspicions 
can be investigated.211 Thus, a judge who viewed Zimmerman as an 
agent of police or quasi-police would be hard-pressed to label such  
actions “provocation” under self-defense law. Nevertheless, were this 
decision operating on a purely conscious level, Judge Nelson may have 
decided that the Fourth Amendment was not an issue before her during 
the trial and the case law was therefore irrelevant. On a conscious level, 
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the judge may have wanted to treat Zimmerman the same way she would 
any criminal defendant in her courtroom. However, on a subconscious or 
unconscious level, the case law might have shaped the way she viewed 
the facts, the law, or applied the law to the facts. 
Consider the prosecution team in Zimmerman’s murder trial.  
Prosecutors, like judges, have to switch their perspective when the  
defendant on trial is a police officer. In motions to suppress, the  
prosecution is in the position of defending police tactics and seeking to 
enlarge the ability of police to use intrusive or aggressive behavior  
toward civilians. Police power and privilege benefits the prosecution and 
harms the accused. When police officers are accused of violent crimes, 
the standard paradigm is flipped. In these situations, police power and 
privilege serve to benefit the accused and hurt the prosecution.  
Prosecutors no longer invoke the constitutional doctrines regarding  
police power but instead seek to treat the accused like any other criminal 
defendant. 
There is evidence that at least one of Zimmerman’s prosecutors had 
a difficult time switching roles. During the trial, the prosecution’s  
strategy was to portray Zimmerman as the aggressor, arguing that the 
neighborhood watch volunteer had no business racially profiling Martin 
at the start, and furthermore, by stalking and grabbing Martin,  
Zimmerman forfeited his right to self-defense.212 Yet, during the closing 
argument in the Zimmerman trial, the prosecutor inexplicably took a  
detour to insert these observations: “Police are allowed to go up to  
individuals and ask them, what are you doing here? And that person can 
ignore him or not. It’s not a crime.”213 
The prosecutor’s observation that it was not a crime for  
Zimmerman to go up to Martin to ask him what he was doing there is 
directly at odds with the point the prosecution needed to make to prevail, 
namely that Zimmerman behaved as an aggressor. The observation  
betrayed a deep fissure in the prosecution’s ability to understand its role 
in the murder case. The prosecutor was not being asked to defend police 
power the way he would in a motion to suppress evidence, but rather the 
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opposite, to show how Zimmerman’s quasi-police behavior was  
aggressive, violent, and threatening. 
Certainly the prosecutor quoted the law accurately in closing  
argument when he stated, “Under the law [police] are allowed to ask 
someone who is walking down the street [what are you doing here?] and 
the person can ignore them or not.”214 That represents the law but not the 
reality of street encounters between police and civilians when police seek 
to investigate those they suspect of criminal mischief.215 This fiction 
helps prosecutors when they seek to defend their officers from claims 
that they violated a suspect’s rights. But that same fiction hurts  
prosecutors when they seek to charge individual police officers for  
assaultive behavior. 
In turn, judges are provided a set of rules to apply to police when 
ruling on motions to suppress evidence and civil rights complaints, and it 
would be difficult for them to abandon those fictions when applying facts 
and law during trials. Case law instructs trial judges to treat allegations 
of police coercion with suspicion and to follow a legal fiction in deciding 
whether a person would be free to walk away from police, free to ignore 
police questioning, and free to assert rights. In context of search and  
seizure case law, Judge Nelson’s two controversial rulings make sense. 
III. HOW TO REMEDY THE POLICE PRIVILEGE 
Trial judges who are regularly exposed to motions to suppress  
evidence based on violations of the Fourth Amendment may  
unconsciously import the Supreme Court’s standards of police power 
into trials where police officers are accused of wrongdoing, and  
sometimes into cases involving volunteers who take on the policing role. 
Whether judges should import Supreme Court precedent involving 
motions to suppress and civil rights lawsuits into criminal trials raises 
difficult issues. On the one hand, it would be odd to give police one set 
of rules that allow them to profile individuals based on race and then use 
that racialized policing against them when they are accused of a crime. 
Similarly, it would be odd to give police one set of rules to investigate 
civilians they consider suspects but then expect the officers to withdraw 
as aggressors when the civilian fights back. After all, once police officers 
are given the green light to act aggressively for Fourth Amendment  
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purposes, one must expect officers to behave as forcefully as the law 
permits. 
While the best argument for consciously importing Supreme Court 
precedent into police prosecutions centers on fairness to the accused  
police officer, fairness concerns go both ways. While it may be fair to the 
police officer on trial, it is unfair to the victims of police violence and to 
their families to bestow special privileges on the person who attacked or 
killed their loved one based on that person’s job status. The police  
privilege also contradicts society’s twin goals of condemning violent 
criminal behavior and doing so in an evenhanded manner. Blind justice 
demands that there should not be two systems, one for the privileged, and 
one for everybody else.216 A run-of-the-mill defendant is not getting a 
fair trial if he is treated unequally compared to privileged defendants. 
Fair trials mean fair to the prosecution as well as to police officer  
defendants. 
Volunteers like George Zimmerman provide another twist. When 
volunteer patrollers act as agents of the police, they should be treated the 
same as government actors. General agency principles govern the  
definition of government action in the Fourth Amendment context. In a 
seminal case, the Supreme Court explained, “Whether a private party 
should be deemed an agent or instrument of the Government for Fourth 
Amendment purposes necessarily turns on the degree of the  
Government’s participation in the private party’s activities.”217 Where 
“the Government did more than adopt a passive position toward the  
underlying private conduct,” it cannot simply absolve itself of  
responsibility by the “fact that the Government has not compelled a  
private party to perform a search.”218 Indeed, police departments should 
not be able to outsource their police work to volunteers in order to evade 
their duty of preserving whatever rights remain to privacy and dignity 
under the Constitution. Arguably, George Zimmerman did not act as an 
agent of the police in pursuing Trayvon Martin, let alone in shooting 
him, since the dispatcher instructed Zimmerman specifically not to  
pursue the suspect. Nevertheless, the fact that police did not compel 
Zimmerman to detain Martin is not the end of the inquiry. For the  
purposes of police privilege, it is irrelevant that Zimmerman acted 
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against explicit dispatcher instructions, for he still derived benefit from 
law enforcement protections even if he did not merit those benefits. 
There are additional policy considerations that favor treating police 
defendants the same as ordinary criminal defendants. Giving police  
officer defendants a special advantage at trial makes it more likely that 
the defendants will be acquitted and that the verdicts will be suspect.  
Society’s interest in fair trials was demonstrated in the reaction to the 
Rodney King and Amadou Diallo verdicts.219 After the acquittal of the 
Diallo defendants, there were widespread demonstrations, while people 
rioted in reaction to the acquittals of those who beat Rodney King. There 
was a widespread sense that when police commit crimes, the victim is 
put on trial.220 Anger at those verdicts stemmed in part from the belief 
that the reason the victims did not receive a fair trial was because of their 
race. Indeed, race and police privilege are often intertwined, for many 
victims of violent policing are people of color.221 Thus, on balance, the 
police privilege is problematic and should be addressed to allow  
disaffected segments of society to begin to trust the justice system and to 
allow society to move toward the founding concept of equal treatment 
under the law. 
The problem lies not with trial judges but with the Supreme Court 
doctrine itself. The Supreme Court decisions mask aggression and call it 
consent, creating doctrine that hides racialized policing and sanctions the 
practice by setting it beyond remedy. Therefore, the clearest solution 
would be to change the Supreme Court doctrine. This would be fairer to 
police officer defendants as well as to victims of police violence. The 
reason it would be fairer to police is that they would be given consistent 
rules to follow. An individual officer should not suffer for following  
protocols set by his department in compliance with current Supreme 
Court doctrine, and officers should not be incarcerated based on a vague 
and slippery set of rules. 
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On the other hand, making it clear that the Fourth Amendment does 
not apply to criminal prosecutions of police officers would help the  
victims and their families. Victims of police violence would receive 
equal treatment to those killed or hurt by civilians. Changing the rules 
would mean the status of the defendant does not determine whether the 
victim receives justice. 
There are some clear obstacles that stand in the way of remedying 
Fourth Amendment doctrine. These obstacles are those current Supreme 
Court justices who hide police aggression and racialized policing through 
doctrinal sleights of hand in order to enlarge the power that police have 
in relation to citizens. Although the Court occasionally issues opinions 
that strengthen individual rights, as a general rule, Fourth Amendment 
rights have continued to shrink after the Warren Court decisions of the 
1960s.222 Thus, until the makeup of the high court changes, other  
remedies must be considered. 
Another way to correct the legal fiction of the friendly police  
officer is to pass legislation that corrects the offending Supreme Court 
precedents. Legislation could correct the license for police to behave  
aggressively without sufficient provocation or justification. In other 
words, legislation would undo the legal fictions that young men and 
women accosted by police are free to walk away and the fiction that  
people who acquiesce to police demands are consenting. In addition,  
legislation should make it clear that orders should be understood from 
the standpoint of the individual receiving the order. Further, legislation 
should include examples, such as police pounding on the front door of a 
home while yelling “police,” which create an inference that police are  
demanding that the occupants open their door. Federal legislation such as 
this will even out the playing field in murder and assault trials and also 
enhance the fairness of motions to suppress. This legislation would be in 
addition to efforts to end racial profiling, such as the End Racial  
Profiling Act.223 
Unfortunately, Congress’s track record of legislative efforts to  
correct the Supreme Court’s racial profiling case law does not inspire 
confidence. For more than fifteen years, Representative John Conyers 
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has been trying to enact federal legislation that prohibits police from  
targeting men and women based on racial stereotypes. Filing his first bill 
in 1997, Representative Conyers continues to sponsor legislation in the 
House, while a similar measure has been introduced in the Senate.224 The 
proposed legislation would have prohibited racial profiling, required 
training to law enforcement on these issues, mandated collection of data 
so that compliance with the law can be tracked, and provided procedures 
for related complaints.225 The most recent House and Senate bills died in 
Congress.226 The difficulty with passing The End Racial Profiling Act 
can be traced back to a lack of political clout. Similar problems would 
hamper efforts to correct overly aggressive policing. The problems  
associated with aggressive policing fall on a subset of civilians, primarily 
on the poor and on minorities—two groups that have decidedly less  
political power than their numbers would suggest.227 
Judicial education might provide some buffer against blinker  
decisions that favor police officer defendants. Instead of allowing the 
Supreme Court cases to unconsciously advantage accused police officers 
and volunteer watchmen at the expense of the prosecution, judges should 
be encouraged to consciously determine if Fourth Amendment police 
privilege makes sense in criminal trials. Judges currently receive training 
on gender bias and racial bias,228 so it is not difficult to imagine trainings 
that target police bias. Judges should be informed that the law does not 
require them to import decisions on stop and frisk and racial profiling 
into criminal prosecutions. While aimed at helping the families of  
victims like Amadou Diallo and Trayvon Martin, this change would also 
benefit ordinary defendants who are accused of assaulting police. A 
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woman who is grabbed by a plainclothes police officer or volunteer, who 
does not realize that her aggressor is an officer, should have the same 
rights to self-defense as a woman grabbed by a civilian attacker.  
Similarly, a man who is accosted by volunteers or unmarked officers 
should be able to invoke Stand Your Ground in those jurisdictions that 
have adopted that law. Making the decisions more conscious for trial 
court judges will not solve all the problems created by the Supreme 
Court case law. However, it should ameliorate some of the inequality in 
police prosecutions. Social science indicates that judges are often capable 
of correcting implicit biases when they are made aware of these hidden 
assumptions.229 
CONCLUSION 
The United States Supreme Court is the unheralded source of a long 
list of police powers and privilege. In the past thirty years, the Court has 
made a series of rulings concerning the scope of police authority. The 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence endows police with broad latitude to 
target and question people on the street, including minors, without it  
being seen as intrusive or even as an invasion of privacy. Overall, case 
law instructs trial judges to treat allegations of police coercion with  
suspicion and to relabel aggressive behavior as nonthreatening and  
benign. Similarly, the Fourth Amendment empowers police to target  
individuals based on race or racial animosity, as long as the officer can 
develop probable cause to believe a traffic violation, misdemeanor, or 
felony was committed by the time the officer orders an individual to 
submit to a stop, frisk, or full-blown search. 
Although no rule directs judges to apply Fourth Amendment  
doctrine to situations where police are accused of violence and stand trial 
for violent felonies, this Article contends that there is a spillover effect. 
Judges who digest the Supreme Court’s constitutional opinions regarding 
police power and apply this case law to multiple situations would find it 
difficult to suddenly disregard these teachings when the accused happens 
to be a police officer or a civilian who employed force in the aid of law 
enforcement efforts. While judges may not consciously seek to treat 
criminal defendants differently if they are police officers, much judicial 
decision-making operates at the unconscious level. 
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George Zimmerman, Trayvon Martin’s killer, was a volunteer  
rather than a true patrolman, yet it appears likely that he benefited from 
the Supreme Court doctrine that condones police aggression and racial 
selection through legal sleight of hand. If a neighborhood watch activist 
was the beneficiary of unconscious Fourth Amendment police privilege, 
then certainly there is a risk that other police who kill will receive the 
same advantage. While part of Trayvon Martin’s legacy has been a push 
to eliminate Stand Your Ground laws, there should also be a push to 
overwrite offensive case law precedents with legislation that encourages 
judges to honestly label aggression as such when the perpetrator is a  
police officer or a neighborhood watch volunteer helping the police. 
Similarly, legislation would encourage judges to label racial profiling as 
such even when the offenders are engaged in law enforcement. At the 
very least, judges should be trained to consider the damage these rulings 
can make to fairness and the perception of fairness. Judicial training may 
encourage many trial judges to resist unconsciously importing these 
troubling Supreme Court decisions into criminal trials where the accused 
is a member of the police team. 
 
